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 Throughout the nineteenth century, an age when British wealth and global power 
were still firmly entrenched with colonies and commerce, Lloyd‘s of London and its 
governing committee cultivated long-standing relationships with the Admiralty and other 
government bodies through personal, financial, and political networks to secure its 
dominance in the field of marine insurance. Although Lloyd‘s, since its founding, has 
centered much of its efforts on the strategic gathering and distribution of information, not 
until the nineteenth century did this practice begin to evolve into a major financial and 
political investment and instrument of power. In 1902, Col. Henry M. Hozier (1838-
1907), secretary at Lloyd‘s, asserted; ―The friendly relations established between Lloyd‘s 
and the Government have to a considerable extent given Lloyd‘s a practical monopoly of 
the collection and distribution and sale of maritime intelligence throughout the world.‖1 
Hozier‘s draft confidential memorandum to a corporation sub-committee, near the end of 
a multi-year series of negotiations with the Admiralty, clearly indicates the extent to 
which the highly evolved web of physical and personal connections developed by the 
underwriting house over the century benefited the entity‘s commercial position.2  
                                                 
1 Henry M. Hozier, ―Commercial Maritime Intelligence in the Further East,‖ Memorandum, Lloyd‘s of 
London, 15 July 1902,‖ in Lloyd‘s of London, Agenda and Memoranda Considered by Signal Stations Sub-
Committee, July, 1902,npn, MS 31642, Guildhall Library, London, U.K.  
2 Richard Davenport-Hines, ―Hozier, Sir Henry Montague (1838–1907),‖ in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/48638 (accessed January 11, 2010). As discussed in chapter two, 
Hozier played an instrumental role not only in sustaining but in promoting a prosperous Lloyd‘s during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. Aside from his personal skills and efforts, his attachment to the naval 
community and British politics in general, the marriage of his daughter Clementine to Winston Churchill in 
1908 further cemented his ties. See Brian Harrison, ―Churchill, Clementine Ogilvy Spencer- , Baroness 
Spencer-Churchill (1885–1977),‖ in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. All citations from the 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography are from the online edition.  
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 A string of insurance luminaries, however, preceded Hozier, beginning with the 
founder and namesake Edward Lloyd (c. 1648-1713), Brook Watson (1735-1807), Joseph 
Marryat (1757-1824), John Julius Angerstein (1732-1823), William Thompson (1793-
1854), and  George Joachim Goschen (1831-1907). These men comprise a biographical 
digest of financiers who led the City of London towards success in the financial services 
industry, of which, Lloyd‘s of London played and continues to play a pivotal role. Yet the 
institution has been remarkably ignored by scholars and is markedly absent in most 
surveyed works concerning the history of the growth of shipping, the industry that 
formed the reason for its very existence, and the British Empire. This omission is 
particularly unwarranted in light of the entity‘s significant public presence throughout the 
nineteenth century, not only in government and trade, but also in the lives of sailors, their 
families, and the popular imagination. For example, when Van Helsing seeks word of the 
Czarina Catherine, a ship bound for the Black Sea with the monster on board in Bram 
Stoker‘s 1897 book Dracula, he is directed to Lloyd‘s for information on its progress; 
excepting the tracking of a supernatural being, this advice would not have been 
uncommon.3 Even well into the twentieth century, the corporation‘s global reach found 
its way onto the silver screen in Tyrone Power‘s first breakthrough role as a romanticized 
agent in Lloyd‟s of London.4  Despite this hold on the imagination of readers and 
moviegoers and significant impact on the expansion of Britain‘s naval and political 
power, recent scholarship on the subject is largely absent in the field of business, not to 
mention social history. 
                                                 
3 Bram Stoker, Dracula (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Library, 1996), 321, 338-39. 
4 Lloyd‟s of London, VHS, directed by Henry King (Twentieth Century Fox, 1936). 
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 Insurance, by its very nature, is a secondary enterprise, and that covering the 
merchant marine is even one step further removed from the actual creation of physical 
goods, the ultimate object of consumption. As such, the field is inescapably linked to 
fluctuations in supply and demand, and in the case of Lloyd‘s, that involving 
international and inter-colonial shipping. This condition made the business conducted by 
underwriters both dependent on the fruits of the Industrial Revolution and an integral part 
of it. Recent estimates by Javier Cuenca Esteban, as cited by Charles More in 
Understanding the Industrial Revolution, suggest that industrial exports, in constant 
dollars, grew nearly eight times over the eighteenth century and tripled between 1801 and 
1831.5 This expansion was concurrent with the great increase in profits and risks 
undertaken by members of Lloyd‘s, the abolition of a century-old monopoly on corporate 
marine insurance and increased interest by London‘s financial elite in joining the field. In 
the latter half of the century, between 1860 and 1910, new developments in marine 
technology and communication contributed to a further growth in commerce, as, for 
example, Britain‘s trade with Australia grew from £17,100,000 to £60,000,000 a year, 
and that with South Africa rose from a modest £3,900,000 to a stunning £29,900,000.6 
This thesis, in examining Lloyd‘s of London, provides a portrait of a service sector 
industry vital to the growth of shipping, directly correlated to exports and imports 
because of the confidence insurance gave to owners and marketers. The industry‘s 
successes and failures were mirrored in supply and demand in a period of rapid economic 
development, innovation, and expansion and of the British Empire. As early as 1902, 
John Atkinson Hobson critiqued imperialism as an instigator and instrument of conflict. 
                                                 
5 Charles More, Understanding the Industrial Revolution (New York: Routledge Press, 2000), 89. 
6 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 168. 
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He offered an alternative ―internationalism‖ led by private ―economic forces‖ that would 
cooperate in transnational transport and communications whose mechanisms would later 
evolve into public enterprises. The result would be a ―weaving [of] an elaborate network 
of intellectual internationalism, and both economic and intellectual community of needs 
and interests would contribute to the natural growth of such political solidarity as was 
required to maintain this real community.‖7 Unsurprisingly, while Lloyd‘s of London did 
not, in the end, contribute to a unified Europe free from national conflict, the corporation 
did hold a unique place in international relations. It actively engaged with its own and 
foreign governments while its communications network greatly contributed to the 
avoidance and resolution of international claims disputes. Concurrently, its leadership 
frequently engaged with the public sphere to further corporate interests. 
 Both Marxist and non-Marxist historians and theorists have approached this era 
with the assumption that ―British industrialization caused an overextending and 
intensifying development of overseas regions,‖ and few scholars until recently have 
sought to offer an alternative.8 J.A. Schumpter, one of those dissidents, writing on 
Germany, instead argued that imperialism was the ―product of pre-capitalist, especially 
aristocratic, forces which mobilized the wealth produced by capitalist industry for 
militarist and imperialist ends.‖9 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, in their offering of a third 
alternative, criticize this latter approach for its focus on simply explaining how these 
landed classes, as remnants of a less evolved capitalism, engaged in the largely bourgeois 
                                                 
7 John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1902), 384-5. Courtesy of 
Google Books. 
8 See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins‘ discussion of J. Gallagher and R. Robinson‘s 1953 work ―The 
Imperialism of Free Trade, 1815-1914‖ in ―Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas: I. 
The Old Colonial System, 1688-1850,‖ Economic History Review 39, no. 4 (1986): 501; V.I. Lenin, 
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916. Online, Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham 
University, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1916lenin-imperialism.html (accessed 22 February 2010). 
9 Cain and Hopkins, ―Gentlemanly Capitalism,‖ 502. 
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enterprises of production rather than providing any new approach to the tension between 
the middle class and traditional social elite during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
and its influence on the colonial development.10 They argue this longstanding approach 
ignores the introduction of new members into the ranks of the political and social elite, 
particularly as evidenced by those who gained prominence through their involvement in 
finance. Families founded dynasties, complete with titles, based on service-sector wealth 
in this period just as had been done centuries earlier through the accumulation of land.11 
 Cain and Hopkins discard a framework that strictly emphasizes production, 
regardless of which class drove it, and the growth of the British Empire. Instead, these 
authors place ―non-industrial, though still capitalist‖ service industries as a primary 
facilitator of both manufacturing and their subsequent domestic use and international 
consumption. They assert that a traditional interpretation highlighting family and 
economic connections among the upper-classes and an aversion to manual labor drove 
many of the country‘s financial and political leaders into fields that fall under the 
category of ―gentlemanly capitalism,‖ meaning enterprises that allowed for a lifestyle 
reminiscent of the landed classes, that is, time for leisure and thus leadership.12 As these 
scholars clearly articulated, ―Working for money, as opposed to making it, was 
associated with dependence and cultural inferiority.‖13 Just as education and class gave 
the pre-industrial elite a social exclusivity that led to strong emotive (class-based) and 
personal relationships, prominent members of the financial world in the City of London 
operated in a similar manner, whether they came from traditional landed aristocratic 
                                                 
10 Cain and Hopkins, ―Gentlemanly Capitalism,‖ 502-3. 
11 The Rothschilds and Barings exemplify this tradition. 
12 Cains and Hopkins, ―Gentlemanly Capitalism,‖ 504-5. 
13 Cains and Hopkins, ―Gentlemanly Capitalism,‖ 505. 
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families or not.14 They did not exclusively create wealth through production and trade, 
but facilitated it, gaining power through their necessary position as sources of capital for 
industrial manufacturing and commerce. As David Cannadine noted, even the Industrial 
Revolution created no new groups that challenged the social hegemony of the established 
aristocracy. 15 However, those in control of new sources of wealth, the City of London‘s 
elite financiers, found alternative ways to exercise control and secure their economic 
position, even if it took a new century for them to start posing an overwhelming 
challenge to the nation‘s traditional leaders.16 Many members and leaders of Lloyd‘s of 
London epitomized this scenario. They served as a vital connection between production 
and consumption. To create and maintain their position, these high-placed and well-
connected individuals entered into complex relationships with government leaders and 
each other, thus continuing centuries old traditions of power based on control of assets, 
including valuable information. In 1974, self-proclaimed Marxist scholar Jurgen 
Habermas described contemporary changes in the world economy, particularly changing 
contributors to ―surplus values:‖ 
the mode of surplus value production changed from the base, where we 
have the production of absolute surplus value, over the base where we 
have the production of relative surplus value, to a position where we now 
have the production of surplus value by engaging indirect productive type 
of labour which is not immediately productive in terms of the labour 
theory of value, but indirectly productive by producing informations and 
qualifications which in turn improve the productivity of labour and 
thereby affect the rate of surplus value and the price of the constant 
elements in capital.17 
 
                                                 
14 Cains and Hopkins, ―Gentlemanly Capitalism,‖ 506. 
15 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 13. 
16 Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British, 13-8, 25-7. 
17 Boris Frankel and Jurgen Habermas, ―Habermas Talking: An Interview,‖ Theory and Society 1(Spring 
1974): 50. Emphasis mine. 
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This shift was not new, and the leaders of Lloyd‘s of London took advantage of 
intelligence gathering and the resulting business efficiency to consolidate their position in 
the industry more than 100 years earlier. Even if this particular dialectic approach to 
history has fallen out of fashion, its inherent focus on the evolution of business practices, 
national leadership, and control of the economy as factors in historical development is an 
important backdrop for a discussion of a dominant private corporation with such close 
connections to power, politics, military action and legislation. 
 The role of individuals, contacts, and networks has long been understood as a 
driving force behind the expansion of British commerce, particularly in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Walter Bagehot (1826-77), writing of joint stock 
companies in his 1860 work Lombard Street, stated ―An old-established bank has a 
„prestige,‟ which amounts to a ‗privileged opportunity‘; though no exclusive right is 
given to it by law, a peculiar power is given to it by opinion.‖18 Lloyd‘s, while not a joint 
stock company, did represent a venture for the privileged, with large sums necessary for 
entrance into the club. Eventually, the underwriting house‘s leadership exported this 
social position through appointment of agents in foreign ports. As often-unpaid 
representatives who regularly held concurrent government positions as consuls and 
military officers, the corporation relied on the status of the position, and the resulting 
secondary revenue streams accompanying it, to act as payment for their services. Thus, 
while the City of London held the core network and relationships necessary for an 
enterprise as profitable and global as marine insurance, the challenge to traditional 
notions of wealth and social position through land ownership dissipated throughout the 
                                                 




world to colonies (based on agriculture), territorial possessions and even foreign states. 
Its members‘ and committee‘s domestic and international engagement at a variety of 
public and private levels acts as a valuable lens through which Britain‘s nineteenth 






















Literature and Source Review 
 
 Lloyd‘s, with some exceptions, commissioned most histories of the institution, 
which were subsequently written by its members. While many include portraits of 
prominent individuals, thereby allowing for a vague recognition of important networks, 
connections, and political involvement, their intent is rather to strictly detail the history of 
the corporation. Frederick Martin‘s The History of Lloyd‟s and of Marine Insurance in 
Great Britain with an Appendix containing Statistics Relating to Marine Insurance from 
1876, D.E.W. Gibb‘s 1957 Lloyd‟s of London: A Study in Individualism, and Vanessa 
Harding and Priscilla Metcalf‘s 1986 Lloyd‟s at Home fall into this category.19 Martin‘s 
work was the first to trace the history of the corporation and includes useful tables and 
data concerning the premiums for particular routes, as well as a snapshot of intelligence 
gathering practices at the time. While including a substantial bibliography, it does not 
provide notes. In 1928, Charles Wright and C. Ernest Fayle wrote the most 
comprehensive and scholarly account of Lloyd‘s to date.  A History of Lloyd‟s from the 
Founding of Lloyd‟s Coffee House to the Present Day, although published for the 
corporation, is the only work that extensively (or at all) uses notes and other basic 
indications of source material.20 Incredibly useful, it provides extensive background 
information on the entity and incorporates other existing secondary material as well as 
the personal papers of some of its members. This history, while effectively written, does 
                                                 
19 Frederick Martin, The History of Lloyd‟s and of Marine Insurance in Great Britain with an Appendix 
containing Statistics Relating to Marine Insurance (London: MacMillan and Co., 1876); D.E.W. Gibb, 
Lloyd‟s of London: A Study in Individualism (London: St. Martin‘s Press, 1957); Vanessa Harding and 
Priscilla Metcalf, Lloyd‟s at Home (London: Lloyd‘s of London, 1986). 
20 Charles Wright and C. Ernest Fayle, A History of Lloyd‟s from the Founding of Lloyd‟s Coffee House to 
the Present Day (London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1928). 
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not extend its scope much beyond the limits of Lloyd‘s itself. While mentioning 
engagement with the government, particularly the Admiralty, the scholars do not present 
an unbiased account and most interactions are portrayed as mostly done as service to the 
public, with Lloyd‘s as the hero.  In the authors‘ discussion of numerous complaints 
―pouring in‖ from 1850 to 1860 to agents around the world concerning overloading, 
outdated charts, and under-manning, for example, they wrote, ―All these matters were 
taken on by Lloyd‘s, alone or in cooperation with the Liverpool Underwriters‘ 
Association, Lloyd‟s Register, and the General Ship Owners‘ Society.‖21 While these 
entities undoubtedly played a role in addressing these issues, the involvement of the 
underwriting community cannot be credited to the exclusion of other bodies. This 
significant oversight, then presents new contextual problems in an assessment of Lloyd‘s 
web of connections. For example, the 1858 Select Committee on Consular Services and 
Appointment‘s report on the concurrent appointment of Lloyd‘s agents and diplomatic 
officers offers a direct contradiction to Wright and Fayle‘s assertion that the corporation 
and their commercial allies alone addressed problems plaguing commerce.22  
   Researchers continued to use this 1928 publication throughout the twentieth 
century, with few, at least acknowledged, returns to archival sources. The scarce and 
largely repetitive nature of these secondary works allows for considerable innovation, 
particularly when, as in the case of this project,  Lloyd‘s of London is used as a lens 
through which to look for the effects of private-public partnerships in nineteenth century 
                                                 
21 Wright and Fayle, A History of Lloyd‟s, 362. 
22 House of Commons, ―Report from the Select Committee on Consular Service and Appointments; 
together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index,‖  Sessional 
Papers, 1857-58 (482), 27 July 1858. This and all subsequent Parliamentary Papers, unless otherwise 




Britain. Twenty years later, in 1948, C. Ernest Fayle offered a more or less condensed 
version of his history of Lloyd‘s in the essay ―Shipowning and Marine Insurance,‖ but in 
the context of shipowning and commercial activity during the wars from 1793 to 1815. 
The few references he made are essentially limited to the 1928 text and individual acts of 
Parliament.23  
 One recent ‗independent scholar‘ and career financier, Anthony Twist, adds 
considerably to the literature on the early history of New Lloyd‘s in his biography of 
John Julius Angerstein (1732-1823), a figure largely forgotten after his death.24 Twist‘s 
emphasis on this underwriter and merchant‘s career, social circle and philanthropic 
activities admirably details the intricate network of personalities and capital networks in 
the eighteenth century London financial sector. While the book largely falls outside the 
period of this work, it nevertheless provides a unique and well-researched portrait of a 
figure instrumental in the development of the marine insurance market. 
 Those texts that differentiate from the model established by earlier studies are not 
primarily histories of the corporation, but focus either on underwriting and insurance as a 
whole or how to operate within the business environment.25 Numerous broader accounts 
make reference to Lloyd‘s, such as Robin Pearson‘s 1997 article ―Towards an Historical 
                                                 
23 C. Ernest Fayle, ―Shipowning and Marine Insurance,‖ in The Trade Winds: A Study of British Overseas 
Trade During the French Wars 1793-1816, ed. C. Northcote Parkinson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
Ltd., 1948). 
24 Anthony Twist, A Life of John Julius Angerstein, 1735-1823: Widening Circles of Finance, 
Philanthropy, and the Arts in Eighteenth-Century London (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 
2006), 6. Twist asserts that history‘s ignorance of Angerstein is largely a result of his failure to leave a line 
of successful male heirs. His sons were largely failures, financially, unlike other prominent London 
families who got their start in the same era, such as the Rothschilds. 
25 See, for example, Hugh Cockerell, Lloyd‟s of London: A Portrait (Cambridge: Woodhead-Faulkner, 
1984); C.E. Golding and D. King-Page, Lloyd‟s (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952); Barry 
Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance: A History of British insurance 1720-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1970);  William D. Winter, Marine Insurance: Its Principles and Practice (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1919); Oliver M. Westall, ed. The Historian and the Business of Insurance 
(Dover, N.H.: Manchester University Press, 1984).  
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Model of Services Innovation: The Case of the Insurance Industry, 1700-1914.‖26 His 
essay does not limit itself to positive structural and organizational developments within 
the realm of marine policies, but rather studies the entire industry.  Notably, the financial 
historian mentioned the spread of the underwriting system to other facets of the market, 
particularly Cuthbert Heath‘s entry into fire insurance.27 The innovations Pearson 
attributed to Lloyd‘s, are, however, limited to the entity‘s constitutional reorganization 
and development of its agency system.28 This omits significant institutional developments 
that extend far beyond Lloyd‘s of London itself, particularly its manipulation of risk 
through active interaction with the Admiralty and its crucial role in the shaping of 
regulatory legislation. So, while its insurance products were perhaps unchanging, the 
profitability and demand for it services did in fact alter. Also of note, stunningly, the 
author‘s only referenced work on the subject was Wright and Fayle‘s History of Lloyd‟s.  
 Pearson, working with David Richardson, has, however, significantly contributed 
to a broader understanding of the role of networking in the Industrial Revolution with a 
focus on showing how social webs operated within the fire insurance industry.29 Arguing 
that formal institutions and regulations could not singlehandedly monitor the business 
environment and ―guard against the risk of opportunism, free riding, or cheating,‖ 
Pearson and Richardson emphasize the role of trust and personal relationships as a factor 
in market development. As in the business of marine insurance, accurate information and 
risk assessment proved essential for profitability. Of special relevance to the study of 
                                                 
26 ―Robin Pearson, ―Towards an Historical Model of Services Innovation: The Case of the Insurance 
Industry, 1700-1914,‖ The Economic History Review 50, no. 2 (May 1997): 235-56. 
27  Pearson, ―Towards an Historical Model of Services Innovation: The Case of the Insurance Industry, 
1700-1914,‖ 241. 
28  Pearson, ―Towards an Historical Model of Services Innovation,‖ 244. 
29 Robin Pearson and David Richardson, ―Networking in the Industrial Revolution,‖ The Economic History 
Review 54, no. 4 (November 2001): 657-79. 
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Lloyd‘s, particularly as its members interests expanded around the world, is their focus 
on intelligence. They write:  
In historical industrializing economies, with relatively poor 
communications across distances, the cost of collection was high, but so 
also was the value of information. Networking helped to enhance the 
‗natural‘ efficiency gains of operating in increasingly sophisticated but 
stretched regional, national, and international markets, by reducing the 
cost of information as commercial news and sometimes also capital 
resources were shared across a web of acquaintances.30 
 
Their study offers complementary insight into a related industry, albeit on a smaller 
geographical scope, that shared many of the same requirements for success as that 
pursued at Lloyd‘s. 
 The above contributions to the history of Lloyd‘s fail, in most cases, to project the 
worldwide reach of this business endeavor, specifically as it relates to the political 
environment in the Metropolis. This study seeks to amend this neglect by taking a more 
comprehensive approach with the incorporation of valuable and rarely used primary 
sources that allow for new perspectives.  
 Much of the material used for this work is held in archival collections at the 
Guildhall Library and British Library in London. The latter preserves the majority of the 
works authored and published by members of Lloyd‘s, particularly Joseph Marryat, as 
well as some corporate petitions presented to Parliament in anticipation of and in reaction 
to attacks on the business‘s  monopolistic control of underwriting. The Guildhall Library 
retains the everyday working records of Lloyd‘s of London, including minutes of 
committee and general meetings, reports on correspondence, negotiations with the 
Admiralty and confidential memoranda for its members. These sources are critical for 
                                                 
30 Pearson and Richardson, ―Networking in the Industrial Revolution,‖ 658. 
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understanding the underwriting house‘s goals and aspirations and offers a foundation 
against which their public statements and involvements can be compared. 
 Useful published accounts include texts that  mention Lloyd‘s for international 
consumption, such as guides for merchants, sailors, and clerks. Benjamin Franklin Foster, 
an American, wrote for example, The Clerk‟s Guide, or Commercial Correspondence in 
1837 for the young businessman on the rise. Works such as this, which not only gives 
advice on how to better understand ―the most extraordinary place,‖ but also details many 
of its peculiarities, intimate the corporation‘s importance within the world of trade and 
commerce.31 Similarly, handbooks for those traveling to other ports necessarily had to 
have the most up to date information on duties, allowances, and local regulations. These 
were often supplied by those associated with Lloyd‘s, even beginning in the early 
nineteenth century, as they were directly involved in noting ship arrivals and departures. 
The 1819 European Commerce; or Complete Mercantile Guide to the Continent of 
Europe, for example provides lists of agents throughout Europe side by side with 
observations on the latest local regulations commercial practices.32  
 Domestically, the question of the role of the corporation and its rights and 
privileges complement this study by pointing to the cross border issues arising from 
international trade. For example, legal texts similarly stress the importance of Lloyd‘s. A 
                                                 
31 Benjamin Franklin Foster, The Clerk‟s Guide, or Commercial Correspondence; comprising Letters of 
Business, Forms of Bills, Invoices, Account-Sales, and an Appendix containing Advice to Young Tradesmen 
and Shopkeepers, Equation of Payments, Commercial Terms, etc. (Boston: Perkins and Marvin, 1837), 
204-10. 
32 C.W. Rordansz, European Commerce; or, Complete Mercantile Guide to the Continent of Europe; 
comprising an Account of the Trade of all the Principal Cities of the Continent, copious Tables of their 
Monies, Exchanges, Weights, and Measures, with their Proportion to those in England, the Local 
Regulations of Each Place, their Tariffs of Duties, Methods of Buying and Selling, Tares and Other 
Allowances; Together with numerous Official Documents, Ordinance, etc. Forming a Complete Code of 
Commercial Information to which is added, An Appendix, containing Several Important Commercial laws, 
and the Tariff of Duties, as Regulated by the Congress of the United States (Boston: Cummings and 
Hilliard, 1819), 558. Courtesy of ―The Making of the Modern World: Goldsmiths'-Kress Library of 
Economic Literature 1450-1850,‖ Gale Databases. 
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Digest of the Law Relating to Marine Insurance, a compendium of maritime law in effect 
in 1903, not only includes a history of the body, deemed necessary by the authors to 
understand the evolution and origin of the legislation, but also indicates in which acts the 
organization played a leading role.33 John Duer, an attorney in New York, examined 
cases of particular import to those in the field and included similar references to Lloyd‘s 
and statutory development within the United States.34 The study and inclusion of these 
works is essential for not only understanding the underwriting house‘s contribution to the 
legal evolution of the field, but also for identifying the framework within which Lloyd‘s 
was operating and the pressures to which they necessarily yielded.  
 This research also highlights the unique nature of Lloyd‘s relationship with the 
government by reliance on analysis of British government documents; these sources 
likewise offer significant and substantive indications of the political involvement of 
Lloyd‘s committee members, subscribers, and their legislative allies. The Parliamentary 
Papers frequently include evidence presented by committee members and others 
associated with the corporation as experts on subjects as diverse as the rebuilding of the 
Royal Exchange, the effectiveness and reorganization of the consular system, marine 
insurance, iron vessels and the transport of coal.35 Sources such as these complement 
                                                 
33 Mackenzie Dalzell Edwin Stewart Chalmers and Douglas Owen, A Digest of the Law Relating to Marine 
Insurance, 2nd ed. (London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1903), 170, 174-8.  
34 John Duer, The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance deducted from a Critical Examination of the 
Adjudged Cases, the Nature and Analogies of the Subject, and the General Usage of Commercial Nations, 
Vol. 1 (New York: John S. Voorbies, 1845), 289-90. Birth and death dates unknown. 
35 House of Commons, Select Committee on Metropolis Improvements, ―Second Report from Select 
Committee on Metropolis Improvements; with the minutes of evidence, appendix, index, and plans,‖ 
Sessional Papers, 1837-38 (661), Metropolis Improvements, 2 August 1838; House of Commons, Select 
Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services, ―Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and 
Consular Services; together with the proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and 
Index,‖ Sessional Papers, 1872 (314), Diplomatic and Consular Services, 16 July 1872; (289). Islands: 
Southern Ocean, 1 June 1876; House of Commons, ―Merchant ships freeboard. Copy of correspondence 
between the Board of trade, the committee for managing the affairs of Lloyd‘s, the Committee of Lloyd‘s 
Register of British and Foreign Shipping, and the Committee of Underwriters‘ Registry of Iron Vessels, 
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other primary materials, particularly the confidential memoranda and communications 
between Lloyd‘s and the Admiralty, as well as other government officials, as both parties 
sought to maximize the benefits from their relationship. The public expression of the 
partnership as a service industry reinforces its image in leadership, a role the 
underwriting house consistently sought. 
 Taken together, the sources for this paper allow for a history not just of Lloyd‘s, 
but also of this powerful entity‘s role in policy formation, pursuit of power and its impact 
on the merchant environment throughout the empire. Necessarily, the part this private 
institution played in the development of far-flung colonial holdings, increased domestic 
wealth, philanthropic patriotism and improved maritime safety cannot be limited to a 
study of the underwriting firm, but these achievements may be highlighted through 
investigation of its private planning and public goals and the place they took in society. 
 The first chapter provides important background information on the process of 
underwriting itself. It focuses on the financial crisis that first stimulated Lloyd‘s 
development and also articulates and explains the rapid growth the institution 
experienced resulting from the nearly continuous military conflicts, especially during the 
Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century based on minutes from meetings and 
government records. Chapter two explores the challenges to the business model put 
forward by hopeful competitors as Lloyd‘s near monopoly on the writing of insurance 
                                                                                                                                                 
having for their part to ascertain whether any principles can be adopted for determining the proper amount 
of freeboard in merchant ships,‖ Sessional Papers, 1876 (8), Merchant Ships Freeboard, 8 February 1876; 
House of Commons, ―Coal cargoes (Spontaneous combustion, &c.). List of cases of spontaneous 
combustion, or of explosion of coal, on board ship, reported to the Board of trade since the date of the 
report of the Royal Commission, showing the particulars of the voyage, of the casualty, and of the cargo 
and ventilatics in each case; also, list of ship‘s wholly laden with coal reported as missing since the date of 
the report of the Royal Commission, with such  particulars of the voyage and cargo as can be ascertained; 
and, copy of correspondence between the Board of Trade and the committee for managing the affairs of 




gradually eroded. More importantly, however, it examines the strategies employed by its 
members in a drastic, and ultimately incredibly successful, attempt to stay relevant and 
profitable. Most notably, this includes the development of the agency system. While 
these individuals, often intimately associated with the government, did not seek an 
expansion of empire, distance and the slow transfer of information required them to serve 
as Lloyd‘s ―man on the spot.‖36 This personage rises to the fore in testimonies given to 
Select Committees in Parliament and internal discussions as to the desired future of 
Lloyd‘s. The third chapter expounds on these decisions, based on additional company 
resources and Admiralty documents, as one of the corporation‘s most notable figures 
bargained and interacted with foreign and domestic partners to establish close to 
complete control over maritime information in Great Britain. Throughout all of these 
threads, the complex web of relationships that drove Lloyd‘s success is brought to the 
forefront. The interchange of ideas, information and governmental concessions granted to 
this underwriting giant are essential for understanding how the house reached its 








                                                 
36 For a discussion of the role of the man on the spot see John S. Galbraith, ―The ‗Turbulent Frontier‘ As a 
Factor in British Expansion,‖ Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, no. 2 (January 1960): 150. 
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Chapter 1: Underwriting and the Rise of Lloyd’s 
  
 Underwriting is a unique manner of effecting insurance, with individuals, rather 
than a corporate entity, taking either the profits from premiums or making payments on 
policies. Insurance as a whole emerged in force in the early eighteenth century as a 
popular speculative undertaking, with policies ranging from protection against death by 
gin drinking and even an ―assurance of female chastity.‖37 The concept of marine 
insurance, particularly as a corporation, emerged in 1717, as just one adventure amongst 
a flurry of others.38 The origin and success of underwriting, at least in Britain, directly 
evolved from a financial crisis of the early eighteenth century. In 1720, South Sea stock 
plunged 87 percent, thus marking one of the worst financial crashes of the era.39 
Immediately following the devaluation, Parliament took steps to regulate rampant 
speculation by joint stock companies, largely seen as the cause of the challenge, through 
the passage of the Bubble Act.40 The intent and driving force behind the legislation that 
followed has recently been interpreted in two ways. The first is that the ―Bubble Act was 
a government-created entry barrier designed to put out of business (and hinder 
development of) all business associations which were competing with Parliament‘s 
chartering business.‖41 Ron Harris, building on the theme of barrier creation, shifted the 
impetus from the government to the South Sea Company. In this approach, company 
leaders lobbied for the bill‘s creation and passage ―to hinder alternative investment 
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38 Wright and Fayle, A History of Lloyd‟s, 44. 
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Economic History 54, No. 3 (September 1994): 610. 
40 Harris, ―The Bubble Act,‖ 611. 
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opportunities and to divert more capital to South Sea shares.‖42 Either finding comes to 
the same conclusion: the act limited opportunities for investment. In April 1720, John 
Hungerford (1657-1729), chairman of the Commons committee to investigate the issue, 
reported that the South Sea Act (6 Geo. I, c.4) had received royal assent.43 Over the next 
month, legislators attached numerous amendments to it, one of which had a far-reaching 
impact on the development of Lloyd‘s and marine insurance as a whole, as savvy 
investors sought the incorporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance and London 
Assurance companies. Both entities had been under investigation by the same committee 
drafting the bill ―for improper private subscription,‖ but after they offered £300,000 to 
pay off the King‘s Civil List debt, began to receive support for their enterprise.44 Clause 
eighteen specifically barred the establishment of corporate undertakings without the 
express permission of the Crown, either through an act of Parliament or a royal charter: 
 All undertakings… presuming to act as a corporate 
body…raising…transferable stock…transferring…shares in such 
stock…without legal authority, either by Act of Parliament, or by any 
Charter from the Crown,…and acting…under any charter…for raising a 
capital stock…not intended…by such Charter…and all acting…under any 
obsolete Charter…for ever be deemed to be illegal and void.45 
 
By June 1720, the king had given both assurance companies charters allowing them to 
operate.46 The bill further prohibited any corporate body from operating under ―obsolete 
charters,‖ with exceptions made for the powerful East India and South Sea Companies, as 
well as any others granted such privileges before 24 June 1718.47 Specific to the 
                                                 
42 Harris, ―The Bubble Act,‖ 612. 
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insurance business, ―all policies issued by such Corporations, societies, or partnerships, 
were declared to be ipso facto void, and all sums underwritten were liable to be sued for 
and forfeited, one half to the King, and one half to the informer.‖48 This language, 
notably, did not mention individual underwriters, who were, in fact, later in the bill, 
specifically given the right to carry on business.49 Thus, underwriting emerged as a major 
market for marine insurance. With insurance companies limited to the Royal Exchange 
and London Assurance, Lloyd‘s structured itself as a direct response to this legal and 
business environment. 50As corporate policies were now largely illegal, both the 
premiums and risk had to be held by the individual, whose entire estate was considered 
collateral.51  
 By the end of the eighteenth century, simultaneous developments in general 
business practices accompanied the change in insurance structure, particularly the rise of 
the individual merchant in place of  the chartered company, the separation of the shipping 
business from purveyors of transported goods, and the emergence of the ―specialized 
commercial coffee-house.‖52 The second of these, the shippers, which developed over the 
eighteenth century until its permanent establishment at the beginning of the nineteenth, is 
significant if for no other reason than that these were the same clients with whom Lloyd‘s 
did business. Before the advent of the profession of ―shipowner,‖ vessel ownership was 
divided into as many as sixty-four shares. While those traveling overseas were often 
owned by one mercantile firm, several individuals usually held coastal boats. With so 
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many interests having at least nominal control over a ship, the actual managing of the 
vessel was often undertaken by either the master or perhaps an investor with significant 
experience in the field.53 By the nineteenth century, this practice grew out of fashion, as 
the colorful Swinton Holland (1777-1828), with Baring Brothers, indicated in 1826; 
―Within the last thirty years, the shipowners of London have entirely changed 
character…the merchant and the shipowner becoming two distinct classes.‖54 This 
process had begun a century or more earlier, however, with new institutions developing 
that catered to those mainly concerned with shipping interests. 
 As early as 1720, proponents of corporate assurance policies had complained 
about the inefficiencies of the system, not only because of the effort necessary to find 
appropriate levels of backing, but also the difficulty that accompanied any potential 
litigation.55 The evolution of the central coffee house, and specifically Lloyd‘s, was an 
answer to this. Lloyd‘s of London was and is not an insurance firm, but rather a common 
roof and market under which individuals gather, share information, make informed 
decisions, and attract clients through a streamlined process. Within this period of national 
economic and business development, Lloyd‘s slowly evolved over the century to achieve 
its commanding institutional status.  
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 As the merchant marine industry evolved, the development of specialized 
markets, often located in coffee-houses, became necessary to increase the ease with 
which those seeking coverage could obtain it. In order to dissipate the chance of financial 
ruin through an ill-informed or unlucky coverage, most underwriters only consented to 
take a small part of the risk. A clerk‘s guide from 1834 aptly illustrates the process the 
merchant or shipowner went through to obtain complete coverage: 
 Having occasion to effect an insurance upon a shipment of merchandise 
from London to Genoa, I give my broker written orders to do it at the 
lowest possible premium. He accordingly requires a note of every 
particular connected with the shipment, with which it is my business to 
furnish him…upon the receipt of this order, a policy will be prepared, in 
which the name and voyage of the vessel will be entered56 
 
Following this draft, the broker took it to Lloyd‘s, where he sought to obtain the lowest 
rate possible to cover a potential loss. The author of the same guide indicated that on a 
£5,400 form, it could take up to twenty-seven signatories, acting entirely separately, to 
cover the entire amount, with each accepting party contributing an average of £200 
towards the total.57 Each of those would be personally responsible for the entirety of the 
payment on the loss, should it be necessary. Using the same example, the merchant 
seeking the coverage would pay a premium of twenty-five shillings per cent, with an 
additional five for a stamp, bringing the total to one and a half pounds per hundred.58 
Thus, to cover the entire premium, the insured would pay £81. Understandably, if this 
process were repeated at offices around London, instead of one central location, it would 
have been inefficient and costly. This example from 1837 indicates the extent to which 
the business of underwriting had developed since the early eighteenth century. 
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 While it originated in the late seventeenth century, and in fact successfully 
weathered the 1720 South Sea Bubble crisis, the corporation in its current form dates 
only to 1771.59 Two years earlier, a group of men left what had been Lloyd‘s Coffee 
House to form their own underwriting organization, called New Lloyd‘s, reacting to 
charges of speculation from which they wished to distance themselves.60 This desire 
comes as no surprise, considering the numerous failures of insurance adventures 
throughout the century. On 13 December 1771, this group, then consisting of seventy-
nine names, formally subscribed to New Lloyd‘s.61 This marked the beginning of the 
Lloyd‘s of London that still exists today.  
 This new organization sought to mark its legitimacy with a formal structure, both 
physically and administratively. Each individual subscribed by committing £100 towards 
the purchase or construction of a new building. They assigned the administrative and 
managerial power to do this to a committee of nine that included prominent merchants 
and businessmen. 62  One of these, Brook Watson (1735-1807), who, in the following 
years, took an active role in not only shaping the house, was also one of the first figures 
to bridge the gap between the underwriting body and the government. Orphaned at the 
age of six, he was apprenticed to a merchant relative and went to sea as a young man. 
While completing his naval service in the Caribbean, a shark took one of his legs while in 
Havana. By 1759 he had established himself as a merchant in London, where he took an 
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active role in city politics and defense. In 1782 he went to Canada to serve as 
commissary-general of the army where he remained until 1783. Upon his return to 
London, he not only joined New Lloyd‘s but was also elected MP for the City of London 
from 1784 until 1793. Watson served as director of the Bank of England and in 1786 
became an alderman and sheriff. He served with the duke of York‘s army in Flanders 
from 1793 to 1795 and was elected Lord Mayor of London in 1796.63 During these years, 
while holding these concurrent positions of authority, Watson continued to sit on the 
committee of Lloyd‘s, often chairing some of its most important meetings.64  
 In this same period, another equally notable figure, John Julius Angerstein (1732-
1823) was instrumental in the establishment of Lloyd‘s. While little is known about his 
origins, family tradition held him to be the son of Empress Anne and a Russia merchant 
named Andrew Poulett Thompson, in whose London business he got his start in 
insurance. He had his own brokerage firm by 1770, and at the time of his retirement in 
1810 controlled 200 accounts. While not personally involved in politics, he nevertheless 
exerted his own influence on legislative matters and policy issues throughout the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, including working with Prime Minister 
William Pitt (1759-1806) in 1793 on the creation of the ―exchequer bill to ease 
commercial credit.‖65 Outside of Lloyd‘s, perhaps his most lasting influence extends 
from his fine art collection.  In 1824, following his death, the government purchased 
thirty-eight of his paintings, including works by Rembrandt, Rubens, and Raphael, for 
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£57,000. These works of art later formed the core of the National Gallery in London.66 
Friends with the likes of Samuel Johnson (1709-84) and Sir Thomas Lawrence (1769-
1830), Angerstein also actively associated with those in the royal court and in political 
and financial circles.67 
 The coalescence of these aforementioned historical actors as the committee of 
Lloyd‘s presents itself after 1771, when they expanded into the public and very spatial 
corporate spheres. For example, the seventy-nine £100 subscribers pooled their capital 
for a new building. After initially entering into an agreement with John Fletcher for a 
premises connecting to their original modest structure, the committee went through a 
series of proposed sites, including a house in Freemans Court (April 1772) and 
Magdalene College (May, December 1772).68 Finally, in November 1773, at a general 
meeting of the subscribers in their Pope‘s Head Alley residence, the committee reported 
that they had reached an agreement with the Mercers Company for a ―very Roomy and 
Convenient place over the North West Side of the Royal Exchange at the Rent of 
£180/annum.‖
69 Not only did this development provide the body with a roomy 
atmosphere in which to conduct their business, but the location was at the heart of 
London‘s commercial district, and therefore at the heart of the rising second empire. As 
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the Napoleonic Wars commenced and the nineteenth century progressed, this location 
became essential for both the evolution and growth of Lloyd‘s and a nexus for the spread 
of information to the government, investors, and the families of sailors alike. 
 In this period of significant unrest, Britain adjusted to new economic and trade 
conditions brought on by the independence of the United States and the French 
Revolution took hold on the continent. Adam Smith (1723-90), who published Wealth of 
Nations in 1776 and found a willing audience in Pitt, accepted American secession as 
inevitable and urged free trade rather than the protectionism sought through colonial 
expansion.70 These commercial concerns certainly had some validity, as British trade 
with the newly sovereign nation actually increased following their separation from their 
former owner.71 In 1774, the British ships brought in 798,000 tons. By 1792 this had 
more than doubled to 1,563,744 tons.72  
 The Navigation Acts, the most influential of which was passed in 1651 with 
subsequent revisions, which had, for the benefit of the emerging shipping industry, 
seriously restricted imports into Britain from any but her own ships, and likewise 
prohibited the introduction of foreign materials into the colonies except through the 
middleman of the empire‘s merchant classes, inhibited the industry.73 The goals upon 
which these rules were directed sought to minimize any shipping done by any but English 
ships, monopolize colonial markets, and wedge Great Britain between imperial output 
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and foreign consumption.74 By the 1790s, these regulations had been somewhat adjusted, 
compensating for America‘s new economic role, but for the most part, this system was 
still intact. While perhaps still useful for the production of wealth for the merchant 
classes of Britain (though not for the nation as a whole), the restrictions put in place by 
the acts created an appealing and visible target for its long standing enemy, France.75 
 Britain‘s dependence on its far flung colonies was not lost on its new adversary. 
In 1793, as the French revolutionaries declared war against their neighbor across the 
English Channel, one senior member noted: 
 The credit of England rests upon fictitious wealth; the real riches of that 
people are scattered everywhere…Bonded in territory, the public future of 
England is found almost wholly in its Bank, and this edifice is entirely 
supported by the wonderful activity of their naval commerce. Asia, 
Portugal, and Spain are the most advantageous markets for the productions 
of English industry; we should shut these markets to the English by 
opening them to the world.76 
 
By 1796, the republic had taken active steps to restrict British goods from reaching 
European ports. The first order ―subjected all ships carrying British goods to detention 
and seizure‖ and included a stipulation for a certificate of origin, which would later be 
incorporated into the Berlin Decree of 1806.77 In 1797 even greater restrictions were 
placed upon English trade. All ships even partially containing British goods were subject 
to seizure, and furthermore, no neutral vessel which had stopped at a British port was 
permitted to enter French territory.78 While under ordinary conditions, these restrictions 
would have significantly threatened commerce, Great Britain‘s trade policies, particularly 
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the Navigation Acts, simply exacerbated the situation. As all goods, even foreign, were 
required to travel aboard English ships bound for the colonies, ships from international 
origins were forced to dock at the island nation‘s ports, thus instantly making them 
―legitimate‖ targets for French confiscation. As a result, any merchant who relied on 
overseas transportation, regardless of the point of origin, could have both vessels and 
goods taken. 
 Following Napoleon Bonaparte‘s (1769-1821) successful campaign against Italy 
and Austria, ending in the Treaty of Campo Formio, the general wrote to Charles Maurice 
de Talleyrand-Perigord (1754-1838), indicating the necessity of defeating English 
commerce in order to gain control of Europe, cutting at the heart of British ―free trade‖ 
policy: 
 The English…are generous, intriguing and active. Our government must 
therefore destroy the English monarchy, or expect to be itself destroyed by 
the corruption of these intriguing and enterprising ‗insulars.‘ The present 
moment offers us a capital opportunity. Let us concentrate all our activity 
on the marine, and destroy England. That done, Europe is at our feet.79 
 
In this same period, British naval prestige was still fragile, and the French made 
significant progress towards isolating the Mediterranean by controlling much of Italy, 
Greece, and Malta.80  
 Additionally, the enemy within was also problematic, as cargos were not even 
safe in home ports. One estimate, prior to 1798, put annual theft by crew members and 
dock workers at £350,000 in London alone and further suggested that one in seven 
engaged in the business either took bribes or directly contributed to the situation.81 
Between 1799 and 1801, the West India trade lost nearly £400,000 a year in this 
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manner.82 While this problem was significantly remedied by the construction of the wet 
docks in this era, east of the City on the River Thames, to which merchants were 
compulsorily made a part by certain provisions in the charters of the various dock 
companies, this innovation only limited theft in the burgeoning metropolitan area, not 
throughout the empire.83 
 While these proceedings (both war and theft) injured shipping as a whole, one 
group gained immense profit and prestige from such challengers: underwriters. That 
Lloyd‘s of London became both a major financial and public figure during this era of 
conflict is not coincidental. Increases in both trade and risk undoubtedly encouraged the 
development and use of insurance by merchants and shipowners. Between the periods of 
1796 to1800 and 1806 to1810, the sums of insured marine property in Britain increased 
from £104,000,000 to £163,000,000, some 63.8 percent.84Aside from the increased risk 
that accompanied the wars, the empire was also rapidly expanding, particularly in the 
West Indies, where the British sugar industry was booming, helped by increased demand 
and the French loss of Haiti.85 By 1814 the British had acquired St. Lucia, Trinidad, 
Tobago, Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Thomas, Curacao, St. Eustatius, Surinam, 
Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, most of which significantly added to the amount of 
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raw materials, especially sugar, that made it into England.86 Despite an increased capacity 
for productivity, however, these merchants and shipowners were still subject to 
restrictions placed upon them by the Navigation Acts as well as drastic increases in 
premiums for insurance policies. One active underwriter from the period, George 
Hobson, left behind detailed records of the rates he charged for voyages.87(See Table 1) 
Table 1:Typical Premiums 1810-14 from George Hobson‘s Books88 
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Rates particularly spiked in 1812 in trade with the Americas as war between Britain and 
the United States broke out. The drop off by nearly 10 percent between 1814 and 1816 
for the same route is also notable. In terms of revenue, these rates both represented 
substantial sums and generated them. In 1811 for example, underwriters covered 109 
outbound risks to Jamaica, worth £16,206, which brought in £1,183 in premiums at 7 
percent. Underwriters earned £3,338 on 160 vessels that were covered on a return trip, 
with a value of £40,165, at 8.3 percent.89 The end of the wars and improved safety at sea 
drastically reduced these profits, as rates charged to shipowners decreased, in 1816 to the 
same destinations, to 2 and 3.6 percent, respectively.90 
 While this period was unquestionably lucrative for individual underwriters, it also 
thrust Lloyd‘s into a new position within the commercial, patriotic, and political spheres. 
Within several years of forming New Lloyd‘s, the committee began to actively engage 
with the government in ways that not only furthered the interests of the organization but 
also led to their predominance in shipping intelligence and legislative influence. For 
example, by at least 1789, the underwriting house had entered into an agreement with the 
Post Office in which Lloyd‘s paid £200 a year, divided between the Secretary of the Post 
Office and the Comptroller of the Inland Office, of which the mail service was a part, for 
early and unlimited delivery of any matter of interest to the committee.91 After a 
reduction to £100, any payment at all for the service was discontinued in 1793, on 
recommendation of the Postmaster-General.92 When Parliament revisited the issue in 
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1837, it found the system completely satisfactory, particularly the manner in which 
Lloyd‘s made the information available to the public through the publication of Lloyd‟s 
List. The investigative commissioners noted that ―It appears to us important that there 
should be some one public establishment in the kingdom to which reference can be made 
for correct and accurate intelligence, such as is contained in the returns received from the 
agents to Lloyd‘s.‖ 93 By this time agents were spread throughout the world and under 
this arrangement could send all letters free of postage.94 Not only did this privilege 
benefit those underwriting the policies, but a further requirement that all arrival and 
departure  information of ships under sail be available to the public served those 
throughout the business community as well as individuals concerned with the fate of 
family members of loved ones. In its facilities at the Royal Exchange, anyone who had an 
interest could see the books into which the secretary entered the information. This also 
included members of the press, who regularly published the shipping news.95 Often, the 
information from Lloyd‟s List was printed side by side with news of military promotions, 
victories and defeats. Not uncommonly, the information provided by the insurance entity 
also provided such insight. In the Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh) on 9 January 1800, 
for example, the section entitled ―Lloyd‘s Marine List‖ includes the following: 
 L‟Aventure French schooner privateer, of 14 guns and 42 men, was taken 
off St. Maloes by the Aristocrat lugger, and arrived at Plymouth 1st inst. 
 The Ethalion frigate is lost on the Saintes; all the crew saved; part of them 
arrived at Falmouth in the Nimrod cutter. 
 The Caroline, (carrel) of Gosport, is on shore near Weymouth, and full of 
water. 
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 The Skene, Crawly, from Dublin to London, has been taken by the 
Egyptian French privateer, retaken by the Nimrod cutter, and arrived at 
Plymouth the 30th December. 
 The Nymph, Nicholson, from Newfoundland to Liverpool, has been taken, 
retaken, and arrived at Cuxhaven. 
 The Duke of Clarence, Lewis, from Dublin to London, is captured near the 
Land‘s End by the Egyptian privateer, and sent for France.96 
 
This news would have been valuable for people with multiple interests. Those following 
the war could see its progress, particularly the active part the Nimrod was playing in 
coastal defense.  Anyone with family on board, perhaps the Ethalion, would have been 
relieved to know that all on board survived. Underwriters could see particularly 
dangerous routes and enemy activity and could adjust their premiums accordingly. 
Additionally, as in the case of the Caroline, they would learn that payments on a policy 
might be in order. Likewise, shipowners could see if one of their vessels was lost or 
arrived in port. In this manner, the information made available to Lloyd‘s, initially for its 
own interest, benefited the broader public, while also increasing the underwriting house‘s 
financial and popular prestige. 
 In this same period, the committee of Lloyd‘s also became more proactive in 
petitioning Parliament for new legislation and the Admiralty for stricter regulation of 
shipping practices. The first mention of this involvement is from 1781, when at a general 
meeting of the subscribers, the majority voted against a motion to request Parliament to 
―restrain shipmasters from ransoming their ships and cargoes from the enemy.‖97 Little 
mention was made again until 1792, when the committee authored a rather harsh 
criticism of current naval capabilities in the protection of trade. Out of concern for the 
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―large and rich fleets hourly expected from the East and West Indies,‖ they indicated they 
were not, ―with all the means of information they are in possession of, able to see any 
adequate protection at sea from this kingdom.‖ 98 The memorial went on to ask for any 
possible assurance from the Lords that proper precautions were being taken.99  
 By 1798, however, the two entities had reached a new level of cooperation as 
epitomized in the Convoy Acts. Passed in 1798, this legislation responded to significant 
merchant losses at sea. It mandated that trade vessels join a convoy and simultaneously 
pay a fee for the protection. Not only did this act create a substantial source of revenue 
(£1,292,000 in its first year) for the government, it also saved underwriters significant 
sums.100 The committee at Lloyd‘s directly intervened to secure its passage, and probably 
had a hand in crafting Article four, which stipulated that if any ship left the convoy, and 
their ship, crew, or cargo was damaged, those who had underwritten the policy would not 
be responsible for the losses.101  These provisions and relationships lasted throughout the 
series of wars, and even afterwards, as privateers, particularly in the North America and 
West Indian trade continued to attack British shipping.  
 As the war progressed, Lloyd‘s role in its planning and execution continued to 
expand. As the firm received information from around the world for its own purposes, it 
continued to publish much of it in Lloyd‟s List but sent on time sensitive information 
concerned with political events or enemy ship movements to the Admiralty as soon as 
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possible.102 Lloyd‘s, by far the largest house in the dominant field of underwriting (in 
1810, the two chartered companies London Assurance and Royal Exchange only 
accounted for 4 percent of all the marine insurance placed in Britain; the rest was covered 
by underwriters), formed a natural liaison between the government and shipping 
interests.103 In the later years of the conflict, the Admiralty made it a standard practice to 
seek guidance from the committee on issues ranging from convoy regulations, assembly 
ports, and generally any aspect of trade defense.104 Under the Berlin and its expansion in 
the 1807 Milan Decree, any neutral vessel that traded with Britain was subject to seizure. 
As a result, in 1806, the Board of Trade requested an act of deception with which Lloyd‘s 
complied, that while vessels be correctly entered into confidential books, they be 
mislabeled in Lloyd‟s List as coming from European or American ports, as the 
publication circulated widely on the continent.105 Not only does this indicate the extent to 
which this private entity cooperated with the government but also the range of its 
influence throughout Europe. As hostilities drew to a close, the body also participated in 
the peace negotiations with the United States, seeking a more rapid cessation of naval 
conflict.106 
 While Lloyd‘s worked with the government, it simultaneously made inroads into 
the broader national awareness, complying with Habermas‘ belief that public opinion in 
the nineteenth century was increasingly directed and shaped by the technocratic 
bourgeois elite, even if it was directed towards a broad social interest, by providing 
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lifeboats to the coasts and the creation of the Patriotic Fund.107 Angerstein collaborated 
with the Duke of Northumberland to solicit donations to fund the first vessel constructed 
solely for the purpose of rescuing shipwrecked crews.108 In 1802 the committee extended 
this service and sought £2,000 for the development of more boats stationed on the coast 
of the United Kingdom.109 Lloyd‘s financed and ran this institution until the government-
run National Lifeboat Institution took over in 1824.110  
 In 1803 the committee undertook another lasting venture, Lloyd‘s Patriotic Fund. 
In July of this year, the body began to accept subscriptions to a general fund to relieve the 
widows and orphans of deceased and disabled sailors and soldiers from the Napoleonic 
Wars. A board of fifty men elected from Lloyd‘s administered and distributed the money. 
This body included notables such as five members of Parliament, including Francis 
Baring (1740-1810), as well as many other prominent underwriters and members of 
London‘s financial elite.111 By 5 August of the same year, after placing advertisements in 
several newspapers, the fund had received £70,312 in subscriptions, £20,000 of which 
came from underwriters.112 The advertisements that accompanied the request, and what 
appeared to be a slowing of responses following the initial flurry of activity did, however, 
elicit a somewhat unusual criticism of the underwriting house related to its close 
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connection with government officials and the general arrogance of its leading members. 
Rather than continue placing classified ads in the leading papers, Francis Baring 
addressed a letter to the chief magistrates and mayors of cities, towns, and boroughs 
throughout England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland asking for pecuniary support. The 
author of one editorial in Cobbett‟s Annual Register said of the document that ―it would 
not have been very astonishing, if they had sent out a proclamation instead of a circular 
letter.‖113 The writer continued: 
 What does astonish one, is, that they should, in this act of encroachment, 
have received the sanction of government, or, at least, the aid of one of its 
officers! The circular letter, coming from Sir Francis Baring, as chairman 
of the Committee, might…being franked and forwarded by the Secretary 
of the General Post-Office, who is, of course, understood to act under the 
direction of his superiors, entirely changes its nature; and to the hands of 
the magistrate, it now comes as a strong invitation, not to say a command, 
to raise money upon the people of his city, town or borough114  
 
He wrote on: ―The magistrates of the kingdom are invited, as they think, by the 
government, to ‗use all their influences‘ in prevailing upon the people to give up 
their money‖ into what he termed a ―committee of stock-dealers, a self-created 
club, assembled at a Coffee House at London.‖115 The author decried the use of 
the government as ―tax gatherers‖ for the committee and he warned of the body‘s 
emergence as a ―formidable rival of St. James.‖116 The primary emotion that 
exudes from the article, however, is not just disgust at such unrestricted 
government support for a private entity but that the fund could ―become an engine 
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in the hands of the monied, against the landed.‖117 Furthermore, the author was 
greatly concerned that members of the navy and army would become so attached 
to the merchant classes, that ―when the interests of those traders are placed in 
open, as they already are in secret, opposition to those of the nobility, the landed 
gentry, and the clergy, who form the basis of the monarchy, great danger may 
therefrom arise even to that monarchy itself.‖118 This expression of fear 
underscores the changing nature of wealth accumulation and the social stress that 
accompanied it. The editorial not only questioned the probity of placing such 
large sums into the hands of a private body but also attacked the institutionalized 
power of commercial society. In placing the committee at Lloyd‘s at the center of 
a conspiratorial financial sector, which ―look[s] upon all the other orders of 
society as made for their use,‖ the author exemplified the economic turmoil and 
development that occurred over the following century as the world began to 
industrialize.119 This criticism, while largely an anomaly during the first decade of 
the nineteenth century, nevertheless foreshadowed attacks from within the 







                                                 
117 ―Summary of Politics,‖ Cobbett‟s Annual Register, 24 September 1803. 
118 ―Summary of Politics,‖ Cobbett‟s Annual Register, 24 September 1803. 
119 ―Summary of Politics, Cobbett‟s Annual Register, 24 September 1803. 
39 
 
Chapter 2: Crisis and Rebirth 
 
 In the midst of martial turmoil, Lloyd‘s faced a threat of its own. The first serious 
menace to the company‘s underwriting monopoly came in 1809 when a powerful group 
of investors sought to persuade the House of Commons to repeal the monopoly granted 
nearly a century earlier.120 In 1810 Alexander Baring (1773-1848), serving as M.P. for 
Taunton, led this first struggle in overturning the monopolies granted to the two chartered 
companies ninety years earlier.121 William Manning (1763-1835), sitting for Evesham, 
introduced a petition in this session for a bill to establish a new marine insurance 
company, because, he argued, those in existence did not have the assets necessary for the 
placement of any policy over £10,000.122  This limited funding posed an absolute 
impediment to their business, as even individual underwriters at Lloyd‘s could place 
much larger policies. For example, the largest risk covered until this year was on the 
Diana, a frigate carrying £656,800 worth of bullion and specie. All of this save £25,000 
was taken by Angerstein.123 This deficiency was both a credit to Lloyd‘s, as well as a 
source of great consternation among those merchants who felt unwillingly compelled to 
                                                 
120 William D. Winter, Marine Insurance: Its Principles and Practice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1919), 17. 
121 House of Commons, ―Marine Insurance Company,‖ 14 February 1810, Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, vol. 15, cols. 399-424, Online, (All Parliamentary Debates are courtesy of Hansard-Millbanks 
Systems); John Orbell, ―Baring, Alexander, first Baron Ashburton (1773–1848),‖ in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography. 
122 William Manning, Speech to the House of Commons, ―Marine Insurance Company,‖ 14 February 1810, 
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 15, col. 399. 
123 Wright and Fayle, A History of Lloyd‟s, 195; Joseph Marryat, ―Copy of a Report proposed as an 
Amendment to the Report Adopted by the Committee upon Marine Insurance,‖ in Joseph Marryat, 
Observations upon the Report of the Committee on Marine Insurance with a Few Incidental Remarks on a 
Pamphlet Lately Published, entitled “A Letter to Jasper Vaux, Esq.” to which is added, Copy of a Report, 
proposed as an Amendment to the Report Adopted by the Committee on Marine Insurance (London: W. 
Hughes, 1810), 7. British Library, London.  
40 
 
place insurance through underwriters, who as individuals might become bankrupt.124 
Joseph Marryat, the prominent West India merchant and chairman of Lloyd‘s for much of 
the early nineteenth century, went to considerable efforts to derail this process.125  
 Proponents of broadening the number of public companies, or at least dissolving 
the exclusive privileges granted through the 1720 Bubble Act, had four main criticisms of 
the current system: a supposed lack of competition that kept premiums artificially high, 
the potential insolvency of an individual should he not be able to cover his agreed share 
of the risk,  a lack of underwriters available to cover the dramatic increase in shipping 
that occurred since the founding of New Lloyd‘s in 1771, and that many subscribers to 
the house were absent in the winter months and therefore unable to do business.126 
Marryat forwarded many of the arguments in Parliament against these accusations, not 
only in session, but in published pamphlets later reused in 1824, in particular his 
Observations upon the Report of the Committee on Marine Insurance. This document, 
coupled with his speeches as an MP, explains both the status of Lloyd‘s at the time as 
well as its self-perception.  
 The first charge against the current system dominated by individual underwriters 
was that as the various brokers all congregated at the house‘s offices at the Royal 
Exchange to find coverage, there existed no state of competition, giving Lloyd‘s a 
monopoly in the business. What this argument ignored, as Marryat pointed out, was that 
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Lloyd‘s did not sell insurance. Rather, it served as an entrepôt where individuals, simply 
making use of the common space and intelligence resources the house had to offer, 
underwrote proposals put forward by brokers. The chairman focused on this discrepancy, 
writing, 
  Premiums are generally lower in Great Britain than in any other part of 
the world; and this appears to be the natural result of the present system of 
effecting marine insurances here by individual underwriters: for the extent 
of competition depends upon the number of competitors. Competition 
therefore is indisputably increased in proportion as underwriting is carried 
on by individuals, and diminished in proportion as it is carried on by 
companies.127 
 
Primarily addressing the issue of whether or not individual underwriting was a viable 
system for the great increase in trade at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Marryat 
stated in the House of Commons that the number of subscribers had grown significantly 
from 1771, from seventy-nine in that year to close to 1,500 in 1810.128 Even taking into 
account the increase in shipping from £1,363,488 in 1778 to £2,368,468 in 1809 (58 
percent growth), those available for placing policies greatly increased as a 
disproportionate percentage.129 Assuming that by 1778 the number of underwriters grew, 
to even as much as 150, the 1,500 reached in 1810 was a 1,000 percent increase.130 The 
system required brokers to obtain the best possible rate, which in essence forced 
individual underwriters to compete among themselves for business - at least in theory.131 
Whether this always worked to the benefit of the broker is impossible to know, and it 
would be inappropriate to exclude the possibility of collusion occurring between 
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members of Lloyd‘s, especially with alternative options virtually nonexistent. One 
merchant, John Inglis (d. 1822), a subscriber to the coffee house as well as the proposed 
new company, indicated that this certainly occurred and that there existed ―a want of 
competition among those leading persons in the Coffee-house who fix the premiums.‖132 
 Marryat next sought to convince Parliament that the fear of insolvent subscribers 
was not a realistic risk and by examining statistics, primarily from the war years at the 
turn of the century, that the claim had little basis in historical reality. The Select 
Committee on Marine Insurance in its investigation of the matter called in numerous 
witnesses, mostly merchants, to inquire into whether or not sufficient and safe 
opportunities existed for the placing of insurance. In doing so, the questioners brought 
forward evidence of several major losses that were not covered from the end of the 
American Revolution. Inglis, a general merchant who regularly did business at Lloyd‘s, 
stated that in the war, taking for example the capture of a fleet bound for Quebec, ―There 
were some considerable failures at that time (by underwriters), and others who were in 
better circumstances, and conceived themselves competent to their engagements, quitted 
the Coffee-house from the great losses they had sustained, to give them time to look into 
their affairs and wind up their accounts.‖133 In 1810 the same individual also stressed the 
possibility of this recurring during the ongoing conflict with France, particularly in the 
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Baltic.134 Inglis explained that the failures were not only attributable to enemy activities 
but also to the peace, which provided both hardships and profits. The former resulted 
from ―premiums being reduced to a peace rate,‖ so that brokers who dealt with insurers 
with smaller capital could not maintain their accounts through new premiums, or at least 
enough to enable them to cover their losses. Conversely, for those fortunate enough, the 
conclusion of hostilities would initiate a brief period when vessels insured under the 
much higher wartime premiums would be drastically less likely to be captured or lost, 
thus bringing in higher profits.135 When directly asked whether or not the merchants of 
the City were satisfied with the quality and availability of insurance in the metropolis, 
Inglis did not hesitate in his criticism: 
 The two Companies may be presumed to be pretty nearly obsolete, when 
compared with the present extent of the business of the country; and the 
extension of the trade has brought to Lloyd‘s Coffee-house a very great 
number of insurers in proportion to the number which used to be 
there…but how far these numbers have added to the security of the 
Merchant, or the reputation of the Coffee-house, I am not prepared to give 
a positive opinion.136 
 
Marryat, in his usual manner, stood his ground and disputed these allegations, attacking 
any form of corporate insurance. Going back twenty years, the chairman indicated that 
ninety-four merchant houses had failed to pay their premiums, while only seven 
underwriters had failed to cover losses on policies.137 He also did not fail to mention that 
in those insolvent houses were to be found ―members of Parliament, directors of the great 
corporate bodies, and individuals who were known to be possessed of immense 
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property.‖138 He also detailed the manner in which funds were collected and paid, to both 
underwriters and brokers, in such a way that most of those who guaranteed policies were 
able to pay their debts, ―unless they exceed all reasonable proportion to his premiums.‖139 
In a sweeping survey of the largest setbacks of the current war, including the capture of 
the Mediterranean fleet, the ―condemnation of the American vessels by France and 
Spain,‖ the seizure of British ships in Russian ports, and heavy damages to vessels off the 
coast of Africa, Marryat wrote that even these did not create ―any failures worth noticing 
among the underwriters at Lloyds.‖140 While this impressive resumé indicates the 
strength of the underwriting house, it does not, however, do much to counter the 
argument of the merchants, to whom a small failure at Lloyd‘s by the bankruptcy of one 
of its members could have meant a considerable loss for the businessman. 
 Drawing on the failures of the 1710s and 20s, he further argued that the only 
reason for the existence of companies was to do what the individual could not, such as 
the construction of wet docks and canals.141 Nevertheless, in recent years he had 
criticized and recommended that even these charters not be extended.142 Furthermore, 
taking the example of the fire insurance companies, Marryat sought to bring attention to a 
pending bill seeking to their preference for ―their own interests to the security of the 
public, the object for which they were established.‖143 Spencer Perceval (1762-1812) 
spoke to this concern in 1811when Baring motioned for the Marine Insurance Bill to be 
read a second time on behalf of the two already chartered companies, arguing against its 
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passage for reasons that provide a unique insight into the development of business 
practices and structure that foreshadowed the incredible growth of corporations during 
the century. Perceval strongly objected to a company formed without a charter and 
questioned such an entity‘s liability. Primarily, if such a group of merchants were united, 
not through the traditional manner, how were they to be sued? If the secretary were held 
responsible, how could the plaintiff(s) expect to have any protection for their property144 
Should every shareholder be accountable? For these reasons, which had not yet been 
worked out, Perceval could not lend his support. Attorney General Vicary Gibbs (1751-
1820) echoed this sentiment, because ―by taking away the liability from the members, the 
security of the public must be diminished.‖145 After more brief discussion, including an 
objection by Solicitor General Thomas Plumer (1753-1824), who believed it would 
lessen competition and a reiteration by Baring that more insurance markets were needed, 
the House voted against the bill going to a committee with a majority of just one vote.146 
 Still in 1810, before the vote, the chairman of Lloyd‘s articulated perhaps his 
most prescient and incisivepoint concerning the strengths of the current system: 
 It is impossible that the acting director or secretary of a public office, 
should possess the same knowledge, as to the extent of every new 
description of risk, the same information as to the means by which the 
decrees of the enemy may be eluded, as 1,500 underwriters, mostly men of 
commercial habits, and consequently commercial knowledge, daily 
collected together for the purpose of communicating and receiving 
intelligence; whose judgments on these subjects are formed and confirmed 
by constant habits of individual application and mutual discussion, and 
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who concentrate the scattered rays of information…into one focus at 
Lloyd‟s.147 
 
Over the next twelve years, the committee at Lloyd‘s sought to protect itself from further 
assault, largely through internal reforms and by focusing on strengthening the intelligence 
network emphasized by Marryat. One meeting from 1800 that examined expenses aptly 
demonstrated an existing deficiency in this area. Payments for the year, totaling £251.3.6, 
included £10.10 to a Mr. Owen, from the India House for intelligence, £27.5.6 for 
Admiralty messengers, and £18.7.6 for foreign newspapers.148 Altogether, these 
payments made up nearly 23 percent of the association‘s operating budget. In addressing 
the issue in 1810-11, however, the association recognized some defects in their 
organization, particularly the informal manner in which information was gathered. 
 A decade later, subscribers to Lloyd‘s also indicated a lack of trust in the 
governing body, which they asserted might have withheld valuable information from the 
Baltic obtained by a contact in the Admiralty.149 The result of these various factors 
coming to the forefront was a drastic reorganization in 1811, principal among the changes 
was the creation of a new committee of correspondence, whose membership rotated 
every month, and most significantly, had the power to appoint domestic and foreign 
agents.150 Additionally, those on the new committee could take legal action against those 
who sought to or succeeded in defrauding the subscribers.151 Essential to this last 
responsibility was the ability to accurately assess potential for deception. The agency 
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system that developed over the next ninety years significantly contributed to Lloyd‘s 
success in this area.  
 The 1811 publication of the new rules and regulations of Lloyd‘s and the 
accompanying instructions for agents offer particular insight into the new priorities and 
goals held by subscribers and committee members. The document contains numerous 
provisions relating to the firm‘s operation, governance, and membership. The most 
important of these allowed for the regular payment of subscriptions, a new committee 
with sub-committees for correspondence and treasury, and the employment of a secretary 
for the day-to-day running of the house‘s affairs.152 A deed of trust accompanied these 
new regulations, which every current and future member had to recognize and sign.153 
 In 1811, the capital stock of the subscribers consisted of £24,000 £3 per cent. 
consolidated annuities, with £1093 12s. 11 d. in cash.154 Members granted these funds in 
trust to the committee of the treasury, originally composed of Joseph Marryat, M.P., 
Horatio Clagett, Robert Shedden and Joshua Reeve.155 In the future, these resources were 
supplemented with £25 deposits by each new subscriber. Furthermore, the new 
regulations obligated every member and substitute to pay a four guinea annual fee for the 
masters and waiters.156 The masters were responsible for the sums received for 
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substitutes, which were to be held for any expenses following the expiration of their lease 
in the Royal Exchange or for other possible, unspecified purposes. 157  
 The reorganization of the committee, and the powers vested in it, represented a 
clearly defined point of departure from the more informal organization that had been the 
standard for the previous forty years.  The committee of Lloyd‘s, since its formation in 
1772, had primarily been concerned with securing accommodations, but during the 
numerous conflicts that occupied the turn of the next century, this group became more 
interested in the general status of members‘ interests, especially in relation to the 
government.158 
 The entity itself consisted of twelve members, elected through a general meeting 
of subscribers. Three of those who received the lowest number of votes rotated out at the 
end of each year. The committee chose from amongst themselves a chairman, the first of 
whom was Joseph Marryat.159 The members also chose a committee of the treasury that 
served as trustees for the general body of subscribers and was vested with control of the 
association‘s funds.160 
 Of particular importance to the future development and sustainability of Lloyd‘s 
of London, however, was the establishment of the committee of correspondence. The by-
laws required this group of two to meet daily to review intelligence, as mentioned above 
and to take responsibility for ―arranging the necessary communications to be put on the 
board, for the information of the Subscribers, and superintending the letters to be written 
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to the Public Departments of Government, or to Foreign Correspondents.‖161 
Additionally, rules granted the larger committee of Lloyd‘s permission to employ their 
own legal advisers in cases that benefited the broad or individual interests of 
subscribers.162 In conjunction, the committee now had the power to appoint agents in 
―any ports or places they may think proper, under such regulations and restrictions as 
their legal advisers may recommend.‖163 Requirements stipulated that a list of these new 
persons be published annually, along with the list of subscribers.164 The committee, 
however, was forbidden to grant pecuniary gratuities or payment for services out of the 
funds held in trust without the consent of a general meeting of the subscribers.165 A 
provision in the deed of trust signed by all members somewhat abrogated this restriction 
and paved the way for another key component of Lloyd‘s intelligence gathering network 
nearly fifty years later: the signal station, which was owned by the corporation and 
responsible for tracking ships and reporting on their status. The funds held in trust by the 
committee of the treasury could be used to ―indemnify the said Trustees, and each of 
them, and each of their executors, administrators, and successors, against the payment of 
the Rent, Taxes, Repairs, and other outgoing of the premises, that now are, or hereafter 
may be occupied by, or for the use and accommodation of the subscribers.‖166 The 
statement continues by granting the use of communal funds by the trustees or their 
successors for ―other engagements, or liabilities‖ as they ―may hereafter be authorized to 
enter into, or may bona fide incur, for the use, benefit, or accommodation of such 
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subscribers.‖167 This landmark deed firmly established the necessary framework for the 
development of Lloyd‘s global intelligence network, as it allowed a subscriber‘s wealth, 
held in trust, to be used for the mutual benefit of other subscribers to Lloyd‘s, as well as 
the general public, many of whom had little knowledge of other parts of the world. 
 The principal intent behind establishing the agency system was to detect, prevent, 
and ―diminish the temptation‖ to defraud the underwriters.168 Likewise, the committee 
expected that those appointed to the position would make this their priority. Additionally, 
those who filled the office within Great Britain were also responsible for providing 
―prompt and regular advices of the arrival and sailing of vessels, of their being in 
circumstances of danger and distress, of the appearance of any enemy‘s cruisers or 
privateers, and such other information as may be important to the interests of the 
Underwriters.‖169 Legal counsel advised not to grant them power of attorney, as the 
underwriters were not a corporate body, but suggested to those filling the post that the 
regulations adopted and secured under the Deed of Trust would carry sufficient weight to 
make that unnecessary.170 
 The instructions dictated that agents should make themselves available to 
shipowners or masters whenever asked, particularly when neither an underwriter nor their 
principal was available. 171 The list of possible ways in which this could be rendered was 
quite exhaustive and extended to those not even necessarily covered by a Lloyd‘s policy, 
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particularly when a vessel was wrecked upon a shore near the resident port.172 Agents 
provided assistance in procuring the best materials available for repairs, drafted correct 
and accurate statements from the masters as to the nature of any damage, rebutted 
exaggerated claims made by the salvors, ensured proper legal procedures were followed, 
prevented the waste and plunder of any damaged merchandise, and monitored the sale of 
the same for the benefit of the underwriter.173 When working directly on behalf of 
underwriters fulfilling the obligations of a policy, they were ―to take care that the 
repairs…are confined to the damages actually received on the voyage then insured, and 
not extend to those that may have been received on any former voyage, or to defects 
arising from age.‖174 Concurrently, Lloyd‘s new representatives, only the most 
―honorable, intelligent, and professional‖ men available, were responsible for averting 
any potential fraud. 175 These instructions were remarkable in that under no 
circumstances, save charges for which the underwriter was directly responsible, was the 
agent to seek any financial support or remuneration from Lloyd‘s itself. By acting as a 
pro bono representative for the London house, Lloyd‘s could gain ever more valuable 
recognition for quality of service while the agent, often wearing multiple hats in the port 
city, secured new business contacts and employment from local sources.  
 In line with this financial distance from the corporation itself, representatives 
were to limit all correspondence with the committee to those points directly of interest to 
the ―general body of the Underwriters.‖ Information of this nature could be addressed to 
―Her Majesty‘s Post-Master-General, Lloyd‘s London,‖ indicating that the postage 
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agreement reached in the eighteenth century was still in full effect. Confidential 
communication, on the other hand, was to be addressed to John Bennett, the newly 
appointed secretary.176 
 Agents outside of the British Isles had additional duties, largely relegated to cases 
of ―capture and recapture, condemnations of ships and cargoes, repairs of vessels, and 
goods damaged by salt water.‖177 The committee particularly warned them against 
allowing the sale of an entire cargo of goods when only a few pieces had been damaged. 
This practice, the committee advised, was wholly illegal. Agents in ports abroad were 
also expected to be familiar with local laws, especially in relation to tariffs and duties.178 
Above all,  instructions stressed the committee‘s reliance on the agent‘s judgment and 
discretion.  The London underwriters had only to observe that they ―require such 
premiums as experience has taught them to calculate will indemnify them for the risks 
they take; and that, as they are obliged to make the good pay for the bad, it is the interest 
of every honest merchant to protect them against imposition.‖179 
 In the set of instructions each agent received in 1813, the committee reminded 
them of the numerous applications they had received by ―persons of the first 
respectability.‖180 By examining the published lists of agents over the next decade, one 
can see that this statement was not only complimentary, but accurate, particularly 
abroad.181 The 1821 list included representatives that held numerous high level 
diplomatic positions. Agents in Gothenburg, Hamburg, Naples, Venice, Patras (Greece), 
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Odessa, St. Michael‘s (most likely in Barbados), and the Canary Islands were Consul 
Generals. Stockholm, Vienna, Alicant (Spain), Barcelona, Bahia and Maranham  (Brazil), 
New Orleans, Norfolk (Virginia), and Rhode Island employed Consuls.  Vice Consuls 
represented Lloyd‘s in Cuxhaven, Dieppe, Gijon, Corunna and Murveidro (Spain), 
Terceira and  Fayal (Azores), Mogadore (Morocco), Portland, Bath and Wicasset in 
Canada.182 In all, Lloyd‘s used agents in nearly 280 different ports around the world 
within ten years of implementing the system. 183  
 By 1851 this number had nearly doubled to 450.184 Accordingly, the number of 
government employees concurrently serving as agents for Lloyd‘s increased. Those 
stationed in the British Isles included six naval officers, foreshadowing the vast 
commitment of Admiralty resources to the corporation‘s signal stations half a century 
later.185 Abroad, Bayonne (France), Brest, Cagliari, Cape Verde Islands, Cadiz, 
Cartagena, Galatz and Ibrail (Romania), Granville (Trinidad), Jaffa, Liberia, Malaga 
(Spain), Syra (Sweden), Varna (Romania), and Vyborg all hosted Consuls.186 Lloyd‘s 
utilized Vice Consuls in many more ports, including Brake, Bremerle and Bremerhaven, 
Bremen (all in Germany), Gijon, Gonaives (Haiti), Kertch (Russia), Maceio (Brazil), 
Myteline (Greece), Portland, Bath and Wicasset, Reval (Estonia), Rio Hacha (Columbia), 
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St. Ubes (Portugal), St. Valery-sur-Somme, Stavanger (Norway), Taganrog (Russia), 
Terceira (Azores), and Trebizond (Greece).187 By 1880 the underwriting house had 605 
agencies and 403 sub-agencies around the world.188 
 In an era before the use of steam ships and the telegraph, the breadth and depth of 
intelligence Lloyd‘s was able to gather, even by as early as 1822, is notable and can be 
seen in a multiyear argument with the Admiralty. In that year, the committee of Lloyd‘s 
started a heated public discussion concerning what they alleged to be insufficient 
protection of business interests from piracy, and therefore excessive payments on 
policies, that brought into question  not only the government‘s ability to protect against 
piracy but their sources of information and integrity. In July pirates captured and 
plundered two vessels, the Vittoria and Industry. The assailants took the sailors on board, 
where they were to be shot one by one until the captain was himself murdered by the 
crew. The new leader put all their captives on board the Industry. On 10 August, the brig 
H.M. Carnation, under Captain Walcott, apprehended them and arranged for safe passage 
to Jamaica. Captain Hearn and his crew on the Vittoria survived to confirm this account. 
A third letter from a Captain Barclay indicated that the commander of the Carnation, on 
his way to Jamaica with specie (gold and silver coins), boarded his ship and warned of 
the recent attacks off Saddle Hill (Cuba). On 19 August 1822, pirates plundered another 
vessel, the Edward Protheroe, in the same location.189 The committee subsequently wrote 
to the Admiralty rather tamely indicating their awareness that the captain of the 
Carnation, who had full knowledge of the threat to shipping in the Saddle Hill area, was 
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instead carrying coins to Jamaica for the payment of the captains and the admiral at that 
station.190 John Wilson Croker (1780-1857), secretary to the Admiralty, disputed this 
assertion without presenting any corroborating testimony.191 The underwriter‘s ensuing 
assertiveness represented a new level of confidence on behalf of Lloyd‘s and a shift in the 
nature of the relationship between the house and the government. 
 In correspondence between Croker and the governors of Lloyd‘s, the former 
invited the latter to call upon him at the Admiralty offices in Westminster, ostensibly to 
discuss the allegations that the Royal Navy had neglected its duties. The secretary, 
however, never stated the exact purpose of the visit. In a flurry of communication, the 
members refused, citing a desire not to establish a precedent for attending to any 
unspecified beck and call of Admiralty officials that ―might be attended with material 
inconvenience to themselves and their successors.‖192 The Lords of the Admiralty, in 
turn, saw ―in your letters such marked disrespect to the board of Admiralty, and so little 
confidence in their communications,‖ that they directed Croker to suspend all future 
correspondence with the committee.193 At the general meeting during which concerned 
parties discussed these issues, Lloyd‘s guardians reaffirmed their confidence in their own 
intelligence gathering and openly acknowledged  the stubborn persistence of the 
Admiralty‘s contention that the Carnation was in the area in fulfillment of its perceived 
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duty to protect shipping.194 Adding additional injury, an unidentified speaker mentioned 
the superior protection given by the United States Navy.195 In response to the cessation of 
information provided by the Admiralty, another stressed that ―they may with truth 
observe, that in time of peace, the communications from the Board, are chiefly 
acknowledgments of information given to them.‖196 The speaker continued, 
―Occasionally they are applied to, to send out Cruisers with provisions and water for the 
homeward bound trade, but as their Lordship must know when a prevalence of Easterly 
wind renders such assistance necessary, as well as your Committee can tell them these 
applications may be dispensed with or if considered necessary may be made through 
other channels.‖197 In a further affirmation of Lloyd‘s ability to operate without 
government assistance, a subscriber boasted ―that their sources of intelligence are so 
extensive—indeed I might say, so universal—that the Admiralty sometimes obtains 
information from them, which they probably would not so promptly procure from any 
other quarter.‖198 Not wishing to alienate others, however, he added that other means of 
conveyance could be used for information essential to the ―public service.‖199 
 The matter did not stay between Lloyd‘s and Admiralty officials. Not only did 
newspapers such as The Bristol Mercury publish the proceedings of the meeting, but in 
the following week, a public posting at the underwriting house sought to further 
embarrass the Admiralty. The Peacock, an American warship, gave protection for two 
days to a British merchant vessel. Later boarded by pirates, the captain indicated that he 
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saw no ship of war from his own country in the area. The owners of the trading vessel 
and the underwriters involved, ―intend[ed] to testify their approbation of American 
liberality, in protecting the trade of all nations,‖ by presenting a gift to the captain of the 
savior ship.200  
 The following March, in 1823, in a spirited, but largely impotent motion, Marryat 
requested before the House of Commons that all possible communication used by the 
Admiralty in their claims be made available for general scrutiny to demonstrate the 
ineffective and inadequate protection of trade.201 The information provided by this branch 
of the government had to be accurate, he argued, because ―not only all the great 
commercial and political interests of the country are affected by them; but contracts for 
insurance of property, to an immense amount, are made upon the faith of the 
representations they contain; and great injustice is done between man and man if these 
representations be inaccurate.‖202 After several members criticized his denouncement of 
Admiralty officials and questioned the appropriateness of the measure, Marryat withdrew 
the motion ―in that spirit of conciliation which had been recommended.‖203 
 Not until one year later, in February 1824, did communication, at least that made 
publicly available, resume. In this message, government officials announced that they 
would begin regular convoys from Falmouth to Gibraltar and on to the Mediterranean. 
Croker, however, did not sign the letter, something which the Morning Chronicle 
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attributed to the ―extreme delicacy of his feelings.‖204 The article continued, however, to 
presume that the war with Algiers, which gave him claim to his war salary, would be 
―extremely consolatory to his apparently wounded spirit, and amply remunerate him for 
the degradation he must feel when his duty compels him to address the Committee of 
Underwriters at Lloyd‘s.‖205  
 Despite these considerable achievements and efforts to improve, in 1824 the 
century-old default monopoly held by individual underwriters finally came to an end. In 
that year, a new coalition of merchants and financiers, including Nathan Rothschild 
(1777-1836), Samuel Gurney (1786-1856), Moses Montefiore (1784-1885) and, again, 
Alexander Baring, proposed the Alliance Insurance Company.206 Introduced on 17 May 
1824, proponents of the Marine Insurance Bill sought to end the market dominance held 
by the Royal Exchange and London Assurance corporations and, as a result, allow the 
creation of new corporate bodies for this purpose.207 On both sides, advocates used many 
of the same arguments from fourteen years earlier, and the House of Commons, in 
investigating the issue, even had the 1810 committee report reprinted.208The debates also 
proceeded in a similar manner, with Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton (1786-1845), M.P. for 
Weymouth,  arguing on behalf of the motion, and again principally concerned with the 
supposed lack of competition, individual bankruptcy, and the insufficient number of 
sources from which insurance was available.209  
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 A close examination of those participating in the public debate over the bill offers 
significant insight into the role financial and personal networks played in politics and the 
formation of legislation. Buxton, for example, was the brother-in-law of Samuel Gurney 
(1786-1856), one of the principal forces behind the proposed legislation.210 For Lloyd‘s, 
MPs Alderman William Thompson (1793-1854) and Thomas Wilson (1792-1869), both 
subscribers, took the lead in the House of Commons. Thompson had made his fortune in 
ironworks, amassed a considerable fortune which he diversified in interests throughout 
London but most heavily in marine insurance. Additionally, he was actively involved in 
city politics, serving as lord mayor 1828-29, alderman from 1821 until his death, and 
director of the Bank of England in 1829. At his death he had a fortune of nearly 
£1,000,000 – comparable to Rothschild‘s.211 In the 1824 debates, he spoke at 
considerable length and presented a petition from 500 individuals associated with the 
insurance industry who opposed the legislation.212Likewise, Thomas Wilson, the head of 
a prominent underwriting house and an MP, presented petitions against the bill.213 
Lloyd‘s also used the services of six other subscribers to present opposition to the 
Alliance initiative.214  
 These individuals proposed several different amendments to derail the process, 
including one that would postpone the commencement of the bill until the year 2000. 
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Thompson‘s more realistic resolution, to make all the subscribers to the company liable 
for any debts, ultimately failed.215 Despite these efforts, the Marine Insurance Bill 
continued to move forward.  
 As the act was working its way through the Commons, somewhat desperate 
sounding letter between a Lloyd‘s subscriber and Buxton illustrates the fears of 
underwriters, as well as the importance of underwriting to the greater London economy. 
This anonymous individual began by stating that had the legislation been proposed as a 
private bill, many of those involved in pushing it through would not have been able to 
vote as a result of conflicting interests. He did not mention the same was true for those 
advocating his position. He also tried, rather feebly, to make this a moral issue, by 
bringing up Buxton‘s strong anti-slavery attitudes and wondering how he could ―allow 
private interest to operate against a large number of individuals whose very existence 
depend[ed] upon the passing of this act.‖216 The author estimated that the City held 2,000 
underwriters, and if clerks and families were counted, possibly 20,000 individuals 
directly gained their livelihood and sustenance from that particular form of business.217 
This number did not include the brokers, who may have been as many as 1,500.218 He 
mentioned again the importance of Lloyd‘s intelligence networks, which he alleged had 
drastically reduced premiums and the information garnered ―transmitted gratuitously 
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throughout the country.‖219 Furthermore, the author questioned the willingness of a 
corporation to take high risk policies and directly targeted Buxton, who as an auditor to 
the Alliance Life and Fire Assurance Company, knew that the company refused to insure 
any (particularly volatile) sugar houses in London. In a post-script, the subscriber thought 
it appropriate to mention that in the previous week, a £300,000 policy had been insured 
on ―one sloop of war from London to Rio Janeiro, including risk of plunder on the way to 
Portsmouth, at half-a-guinea per cent,‖ thus tying to reinforce the argument that 
underwriters‘ personal liability was not a significant risk.220 These efforts on behalf of 
Lloyd‘s, underwriters, and their subscribers/supporters in Parliament could not, in the 
end, stop what one MP called ―the whole united money interests of the empire.‖221 The 
Marine Insurance Bill passed the House of Lords on 21 June 1824, opening the door for 
the proposed Alliance Insurance Company.222  
 Opening the trade to non-chartered entities had a decidedly negative immediate 
impact on Lloyd‘s. Twenty years later, the two original combined with the upstart 
companies had over half of the policies written in London, a marked increase from 4 
percent in 1810.223 Passage of the bill did not, however, create the flood of new entities 
underwriters expected. In 1844, aside from the London Assurance and Royal Exchange, 
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only five others companies had remained opened for more than a few years.224 From 
1810-1824, a new business climate, fostered by competition, forced Lloyd‘s of London to 
accommodate a restructured economic environment and in doing so reformed its 
organization and began to more regularly exercise its political and financial influence. 
Over the next eighty years, its members and committee increasingly interacted with the 
government as the house established complex control over information networks and 
extended its reach further into legislation and regulation. Lloyd‘s created a market for 
information, with often exclusive access to global intelligence, particularly on the coats 
of Europe and the Americas. The agency system, coupled with new technology and 
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Chapter 3: Agency and Signal Station Development 
 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, the committee, and particularly its active 
secretary Henry M. Hozier, progressively sought, and obtained, additional privileges for 
their corporation. Their incorporation in 1871 formalized their business model, and the 
Signal Stations Bill in 1888 identified this specific underwriting house as occupying a 
unique place in the financial world. This legislative and interactive approach to risk 
mitigation was not, however, limited to either the agency network or signal stations, 
which served as observation posts and information relaying stations. Through an 
increased focus on mandating safety regulations and preventing both material and human 
losses, the corporation sought to further manipulate their industry and derive more profit 
and goodwill from their underwriting and influence with the government. 
 Since the initial creation of Lloyd‘s Patriotic Fund, the committee and its 
members regularly sought to provide assistance to the community, at first through 
donations and subscriptions but later by actively addressing potential or existing areas of 
concern. In the last quarter of the century, this engagement took distinct and diverse 
forms – from requesting that the Admiralty schedule regular inspections of the deserted 
islands en route to Australia for shipwreck survivors to more stringent regulation of the 
equipping and construction of vessels.225 The Derelict Vessels Act of 1894, which 
required any shipmaster who came upon such a ship to report it to Lloyd‘s for empire-
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wide circulation, further reinforced the legislatively mandated importance of the 
insurance house.226 
 The diversity of situations that could have a negative impact on the underwriting 
business extended beyond simply shipwrecks, pirates, and other armed conflict. The 
structural integrity of vessels and on-board hazards played a critical role in the sinking 
and damaging of ships and, accordingly, increased the number of policies on which 
underwriters were required to pay out. That Lloyd‘s took an interest in matters as diverse 
as freeboard (the distance between the water level and deck of a ship) and the use or 
transport of combustible coal can be seen through their correspondence with entities such 
as the Board of Trade.227 The corporation‘s direct intervention in discussions surrounding 
these hazards demonstrates not only its members‘ expertise, but also the high regard in 
which government officials held their opinions. Underwriters made use of another 
organization, visible through their publication Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping, to 
complement their own sources of intelligence. This text had long played an important 
role in the classification of vessels as to their level of seaworthiness and, although this 
distinct and unrelated entity did much of the day to day inspection, the underwriters were 
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oftentimes dependent upon it. This institution not only listed every vessel over 100 tons 
operating in Great Britain but also gave their class (their purpose and quality of 
construction), name, and dimensions. Selected foreign vessels registered were also 
included, although the association did not class them.228 During debate in the House of 
Commons in 1870 surrounding the state of the mercantile marine community in Britain, 
Samuel Plimsoll (1824-1898) offered additional insight into the practice of underwriters, 
particularly the way in which they amalgamated different sets of information, including 
their knowledge of shipping accidents and losses, with other complementary studies such 
as Lloyd‟s Register. This particular MP gave an example of a shipowner who had lost 
seven vessels over a very short period of time through compulsive overloading. As a 
result, underwriters at Lloyd‘s refused to provide insurance to him.229 In order to make 
the decision to effectively cut out this businessman from insurance, those covering the 
policies would have had to have known how many times and how often had this 
individual lost ships from preventable causes (which they would have known by their 
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own records) and the acceptable amount of weight, as determined through the standard 
classification system of Lloyd‟s Register.  
 The business of insurance relies heavily upon the possession of information, and 
as a result, Lloyd‘s developed its own exclusive networks to complement those provided 
through Lloyd‟s Register and other commercially or publicly available sources. For 
Lloyd‘s, the benefits of a monopoly on intelligence can be broken down into three main 
categories: protection from fraud, accurate assessment of risk, and profits made from 
selling information. The former two spurred interest in and the development of the 
corporation‘s complex global intelligence network, while the latter was an added benefit.  
 The infant status of international communication in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the slow dissemination of information and its questionable use created numerous issues 
for those in the marine insurance business. Two court cases from the mid-nineteenth 
century, both of which went in a member of Lloyd‘s favor, aptly illustrate the necessity 
of not only gathering also but using available resources.  
 The first demonstrates the lack of and need for a reliable communications system 
not only capable of keeping up with global commerce but doing so in a way that would 
preempt others from taking advantage of the insurance institution. In Russell v. Thornton, 
from January 1857, an insured steamship owner took an underwriter to court for failing to 
pay out on the loss of his vessel. The broker, employed to secure the policy on behalf of 
the owner, received a letter on the same day an agreement was reached to the effect that 
the vessel under discussion had run aground and made her way ―in a sinking state‖ to 
Cartagena. The broker failed to forward this to the underwriter, who no doubt would have 
rethought his acceptance of the risk on the policy. While the court ruled in favor of the 
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underwriter, much time and expense could have been avoided had the insurer known 
from other sources the state of the vessel.230  
 The 1864 case Bates v. Hewitt addressed the issue of risk assessment and the 
responsibilities of the underwriter within his profession. In this instance, a merchant sued 
the underwriter for refusing to pay out on a policy contracted on the steamer The 
Georgia. This former Confederate cruiser set in to Liverpool where she was dismantled 
and sold at a much publicized public auction. Following repairs, the purchaser secured a 
six-month policy from a Lloyd‘s underwriter but did not disclose the ship‘s history as a 
participant in an ongoing war. Upon leaving Liverpool, a United States frigate 
immediately captured her, and the plaintiff sought remuneration. The jury found that the 
underwriter was not aware the vessel was the Confederate steamer, but at the time the 
agreement was entered into, had no lack of available information that would have 
identified it as such. Despite this observation, the court found in the underwriter‘s 
favor.231  
 Both of these cases present two questions: to what extent is the insurer obligated 
to use existing intelligence, and how much is the insured required to freely provide about 
the potential risk that faces their property? By 1903 the law had become quite clear, at 
least in the requirements placed upon the individual seeking the policy. It prescribed that 
if the insurer failed to inquire, the insured need not freely disclose ―any circumstance 
which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The insurer is presumed to know 
matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and matters which an insurer in the ordinary 
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course of his business, as such, ought to know.‖232  The expectation is less explicit on the 
obligations of the underwriter. What exactly is ―common notoriety or knowledge,‖ and 
what should they have known in the conduct of ―ordinary business?‖ Throughout the 
nineteenth century, in various forms, the committee sought to mitigate negative 
circumstances that could have been avoided by simply possessing and using complete 
information.  
 As previously addressed, the system of agents developed as part of Lloyd‘s 
reorganization in the 1810s and 1820s soon encompassed most of the major ports 
throughout the world. Over fifty years later, their duties were essentially the same and 
ranked in this order of importance: (1) provide intelligence to the offices in London in 
case of a wreck, (2) send any other information regarding casualties in the area, (3) 
ensure the proper conduct and expenditures by shipmasters when they arrive in port for 
repairs, and (4) send out lists of arrivals and departures of vessels in his port.233 Almost 
all of those who held the position did not consider it, or make it, their exclusive source of 
livelihood, and perhaps most significantly, many were also British government 
officials.234 As early as 1821, Parliament began to look into the ethics and benefits of this 
substantial interchange of interests. Breaking down the list of payments the consul could 
collect, one in Genoa charged 8 francs 40 cents to administer the oath to brokers for 
Lloyd‘s, and another in Naples indicated he sold goods by auction for underwriters in 
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London.235 Although no judgment was given against the practice, these charges 
nevertheless indicate a working relationship between the government‘s principal trade 
representative in the port and those attached to the London insurance market. By 1858, 
however, the number of individuals who held simultaneous private and public positions 
had increased considerably. These included approximately six naval officers and thirty-
four consular officials out of approximately 450 total agents.236 In this year, the Select 
Committee on Consular Services and Appointments initiated a far reaching investigation 
into the effectiveness and appropriateness of their services. The testimony that 
surrounded the inquiry demonstrated the complex nature of Lloyd‘s relationship with the 
government. 
 The insurance organization had long been in contact with these officials through 
the Board of Trade, and by 1872 received 600 to 700 reports of casualties and disasters 
from various parts of the world in a year.237 In examining W.F. Sadler, a member of the 
committee of Lloyd‘s, as to the custom of appointing diplomatic personnel to 
simultaneously represent his organization‘s interests at home and abroad, members 
conducting the inquiry posed questions that both challenged and sought advice.238 Sadler 
sought to draw a distinction between Lloyd‘s using consuls and merchants doing the 
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same, seeing his own organization as ―an independent office, which brings the agent into 
connection with a variety of merchants and others…and he is generally looked upon as a 
man who is likely to do justice between the merchant on the one hand and the 
establishment of Lloyd‘s on the other.‖239 He furthermore contended that if a business 
person simultaneously held the government post, it would create a situation where 
interests could easily conflict and even ―excite feelings sometimes of jealously in the 
ordinary competition of trade.‖240 Additionally, Sadler commented that, aside from his 
role as simply a mediator, the agent ―becomes amenable to our committee, who are not at 
all scrupulous in such a case (improper conduct)‖ and that he was subject to strict rules, 
such as those laid down in 1811.241 Principally, he argued, the role of the representative 
was a supervisory one that, allegedly, was primarily responsible to ―see that fit men were 
appointed.‖242 The select committee drew from this, and Sadler concurred, that a consul 
who was not a merchant would be better suited for the position of an agent and perhaps 
just as importantly that it would not result in conflicting interests or any undue influence, 
indicating that government interests corresponded favorably with those at Lloyd‘s.243 
While the government examiners did not in the end object to the practice, Lloyd‘s had 
some complaints. One particular incident involved a consul/agent who charged fees under 
the auspices of both positions for the same service, a practice with which the committee 
took issue and reprimanded the individual.244 
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 Nevertheless, fifteen years later in 1872, Benjamin Charles Stephenson (c.1807-
1882), secretary of Lloyd‘s, articulated the importance of this public-private relationship 
during a new Parliamentary investigation of the service, stating ―there are hardly any 
people in the world more interested in the consular service than the underwriters at 
Lloyd‘s, whose pockets are constantly affected by the manner in which the consuls do 
their duty.‖245 In this year, fifty consular and vice consular agents corresponded directly 
with the secretary from ports around the world (Figure 2).246 
Figure 2: List of British Consuls who are also Agents for Lloyd‘s247 
Marked C. are Consuls—Marked V.C. are Vice Consuls 
Ports Agents Ports Agents 
Aleppo James Henry Skene C Lisbon Charles Schnobel V.C. 
Berdiansk James Zohrab C Liesta William Granck V.C. 
Bergen Alexander Greig V.C. Maceio Gustavus William 
Wucherer 
V.C. 
Bremerhaven Melchior Schwoon V.C. Malmo Theodor Flensburg V.C. 
Calais William Thomsett V.C. Maranham William Bingham Wilson V.C. 
Cape Verde Islands Thomas Miller C. Martinique William Lawless C. 
Carthagena Edmund John Turner C. Matamoras Charles Bagnall V.C. 
Charleston Henry Pinckney Walker C. Mazatlan John Kelly V.C. 
Christiansund John Allan V.C. Nantes Robert Charles Clipperton C. 
Civita Vecchia John Thomas Lowe V.C. Norfolk (VA) Myer Myers V.C. 
Cronstadt Walter Maynard V.C. Nuevitas (Cuba) Pedro Sanchez Dolz V.C. 
Dardanelles William Henry Wrench C. Port au Prince Henry Byron V.C. 
Emden Y. Brons V.C. Portland, U.S. Edward P. Sherwood V.C. 
Fiji and Tonga 
Islands 
Edward March C. Randers Jens Hald V.C. 
Frederikshaven Peter Julis Kall V.C. Rhodes Alfred Biliotti V.C. 
Garrucha George Clifton Pecket, 
jun. 
V.C. St. Brieue Henry Angier V.C. 
Gonaives James Bean McGuffie V.C. St. Valery sur 
Somme 
John Ryves D‘Arcy V.C. 
Grand Canary Houghton Houghton V.C. Stavanger Jens Zetlitz Kielland V.C. 
Iviza William Wallis V.C. Taganrog John Patrick Carruthers C. 
Kertch Peter Barrow C. Terceira John Read V.C. 
Lanzarote John Thomas Topham V.C. Thisted Frederick Charles 
Bendixsen 
V.C. 
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Leghorn Alexander Macbean C. Trebizond Francis James Stevens C. 
Lemyig Anthon Andersen V.C. Vianna Jose Mendes Ribeiro V.C. 
 
The distribution of dual agents around the world shows the greatest number posted on the 
north and west coasts or Europe, particularly in France, Norway and Sweden, with others 
spread throughout the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the western coast of Brazil. 
None of the individuals listed as both government personnel and a Lloyd‘s agent were 
stationed in East Asia, including India. This absence is probably explained by the East 
India Company‘s practice of carrying its own risks, rather than using an underwriting 
firm.248 Until 1858, it would not have been practical or profitable for Lloyd‘s to 
significantly develop this region. 
 As in 1858, the representative for Lloyd‘s stressed what he saw as the non-
conflicting nature of this dual occupation, relegating agents‘ duties to supervisory 
ones.249 In this inquiry, however, Stephenson first indicated a preference, in most cases, 
for natives of the foreign ports ―on account of their knowledge of the language and the 
people.‖250 This observation was less one of praise for these individuals and more a 
critique of the Foreign Office‘s system at the time of testing and appointing British 
officials, particularly consuls and vice-consuls, to their positions. The examination for the 
position, ―Smith‘s Compendium on Mercantile Laws,‖ he believed, was essentially 
worthless, as ―any man could cram for that.‖251 This led, in some circumstances to 
qualified, but not necessarily competent, officials.252 
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 Following this line of questioning, the examiner directed queries as to the 
methods Lloyd‘s used for compensating its agents, particularly looking for any 
information that could be used to improve the consular system. Principal among these 
was the manner in which the insurance entity managed to secure capable individuals with 
little or no compensation, at least in most cases.253 Naturally, this savings was something 
in which the government would be interested, particularly since the company 
accomplished it with so much success. Comparing their own experience with that of the 
Foreign Office, the secretary of Lloyd‘s thought it highly unlikely that the diplomatic 
service would have much trouble entering into a similar system with their consuls.254 
 One particular case in 1869 illustrates the level of cooperation and 
communication between diplomatic officials abroad, agents in those ports, the committee 
of Lloyd‘s and government offices at home. The Consul-General in Stockholm, Perry, 
wrote to the Board of Trade concerning the ―continuance of the robberies, delay, endless 
confusion, and even litigation, connected with all the numerous wrecks on the eastern 
coast of Sweden‖ and the activity of a particular organization on Gotland Island 
responsible for the disruptions. In this case, Perry, in contact with his superiors, noted 
that the governing body at the house might be interested in the case, a supposition 
confirmed by Erskine, the agent in Stockholm.255 The insurance house‘s governing body 
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consequently requested that Thomas Grey, already touring various European ports on 
behalf of the Board of Trade, extend his visit to Gotland accompanied by one of their 
own officers.256  
 The ―Gotland Gang‖ operated by having several of their members represent all 
parties involved following the wrecking of a ship. Feigning to act independently, one 
would ‗represent‘ the shipowner, another the owner of the cargo, one for the insurers, 
another as the consular agent, and yet one more on behalf of the salvors. Rather than 
working for the benefit of these respective parties, this situation opened the door for 
substantial fraud. Additionally, as most of the ships and cargoes concerned were British, 
the underwriters at Lloyd‘s suffered regular losses. Bodies similar to Lloyd‘s in 
Copenhagen and Hamburg also recognized the danger this organization posed to their 
own interests, all three of which determined that the most efficient way of dealing with 
the problem was appointing an independent (non-Swedish) man as both vice consul and 
agent.257 Despite some reservations by individual underwriters in Copenhagen as to the 
value of vice-consuls, the Board of Trade nevertheless agreed to look into the 
appointment of an agent.258 Through this communication and cooperation, the Swedish 
government, local merchants, and underwriters throughout Europe were made aware of 
the issue and collectively worked to solve it.  
Information, which Lloyd‘s worked tirelessly to acquire throughout the nineteenth 
century, decreased fraud and increased profits simultaneously. Throughout the century, 
this goal was furthered by the rapid development of new technology, particularly the 
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telegraph as it expanded across the country and abroad and wireless communication.259 
These advances significantly sped up the transfer of data relating to all aspects of 
business, industry, government, and ultimately national defense. The next generation of 
leaders at Lloyd‘s made full use of these developments as they constructed their own, 
often exclusive, sources of intelligence. 
 Following the broadening of the market in 1823 and the subsequent development 
of the agency system from its roots in 1810-11, Lloyd‘s embarked on a period of political 
expansion, during which the members elected as chairmen became intimately and 
powerfully involved in the British Cabinet and the London financial world. The two most 
notable of these were Thomas Baring (chairman 1851-68) and George Joachim Goschen 
(chairman 1869-86).260 The latter is perhaps the most striking example of the overlap 
between business and governance. From 1871 to 1874 he concurrently served as 
chairman of Lloyd‘s and First Lord of the Admiralty under William Ewart Gladstone 
(1809-98), whose father was a committee member of the Liverpool Underwriter‘s 
Association, one of the largest commercial groups to make use of Lloyd‘s.261 While these 
individuals perhaps had a higher profile, the figure of greatest significance in the 
establishment was Henry M. Hozier, a former army officer and recipient of the Victoria 
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Cross, who served as secretary from 1874-1906 and ushered in Lloyd‘s most ambitious 
and successful intelligence gathering operation: the signal stations.262  
 Hozier‘s  relationship with the government, particularly in this latter endeavor, 
was quite extraordinary in that it did not limit itself to interaction with British public 
servants. The negotiations that took place between the 1869 establishment of the first 
signal station at Deal, on the eastern coast of England, and a landmark agreement reached 
with the Admiralty in the early twentieth century, offer a compelling look into the 
intersection between Lloyd‘s private strengths and the support they received from public 
entities.263 This cooperation led to near exponential growth in the number of stations 
maintained by the insurance house. After Deal, the second was not constructed until 1876 
at Dover.264 By 1884 this number had grown to seventeen stations in Great Britain and 
six abroad. In 1891 those in Britain had more than doubled to forty, while those abroad 
had increased nearly twenty fold to 118.265  
 Throughout this period, Lloyd‘s achieved passage of two fairly significant pieces 
of legislation, the first of which was their incorporation in 1871.266 While this  
advancement was perhaps a natural moment of progress for an entity that had existed 
since the 1770s, a more striking piece went through in 1888. The Lloyd‟s Signal Stations 
Bill of that year granted the corporation the power of eminent domain in the acquisition 
of land for the construction of signal stations.267 As would be expected, the presentation 
of this bill created some considerable concern that Lloyd‘s would gain a monopoly in the 
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gathering of information through the command of the best locations in the United 
Kingdom. One MP, Sir Walter Barttelot (1820-93), noted that he ―could not see any 
corresponding advantages which were to accrue to this country, or even to the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, from giving these enormous advantages to a private company.‖268 This 
individual further cited that the aforementioned government minister mentioned that 
―they [Lloyd‘s] never gave any notice to the Admiralty with regard to what was going on 
in connection with shipping or any other matters.‖269 Barttelot continued by criticizing 
the government for putting forward a bill that put key strategic locations and facilities 
outside of the control of those responsible for state defense and into the hands of private 
individuals. Foreshadowing what would occur just over a decade later, he warned that 
―the Government seemed to be about to grant a great concession, which at some future 
time they might have to buy back again at the cost of a very large sum for 
compensation.‖270 Thomas Baring, M.P. for London, countered with a stark critique of 
Admiral Edward Field, whom he argued ―knew nothing about Lloyd‘s.‖ The speaker 
further posited that Lloyd‘s purpose was not to just telegraph the coming and going of 
ships, but that all they ―wanted to do was to make profit, and the way they wanted to 
make profit was to save loss of life and ships and cargo at sea.‖271 For this reason, he 
argued, the corporation would act in the best interest of the public and should be granted 
the right to forcibly acquire the requisite land. By 1904 when Lloyd‘s, to its great benefit, 
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actually did begin leasing domestic sites to the Admiralty, Hozier noted that the situation 
was a direct result of his corporation ―possessing the best sites for signal stations in the 
United Kingdom.‖272 
 The expansion of the signal station network around the world can be broken down 
into three classes: those in foreign territories, those in overseas British possessions, and 
those on the domestic coasts. Examples of these, particularly the private interaction of the 
corporation with various government officials, offer valuable insight into the cooperation, 
rivalries, and goals of each leading up to the new century.  
 Britain obtained Helgoland, a small island off the coast of Germany marking the 
mouth of the Elbe and Weser rivers off of Holstein, from Denmark in 1807. In 1890, the 
government through Lord Salisbury ceded the land to Germany in return for concessions 
in the Nile river valley in Uganda and Kenya.273 The Royal Navy had for some time not 
made serious use of the island, and in 1879 the governor of Helgoland, Lieut. Col. 
Terrence O‘Brien, suggested that Lloyd‘s committee take over signaling at the 
location.274 In 1884 the leaders of the underwriting organization made their first serious 
effort to obtain the government station, which they did later that year after shrewdly 
requesting a £100 annual subsidy to continue the operation.275 Despite the relinquishment 
of the island to Germany in 1890, the Anglo-German Agreement of that year guaranteed 
Lloyd‘s the right to continue their signaling operations. This special provision explicitly 
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stated that all government obligations to Lloyd‘s, including the right to maintain property 
and signal on the island, were transferred to the new owner and had to be maintained.276  
Helgoland Lighthouse and Lloyd‘s Signal Station (X) Date Unknown277 
 
 Following this development, the committee immediately began new negotiations 
with the German government to secure additional privileges and further outline the rights 
and obligations of the outpost. In May 1892, Count Hatzfeldt, attaché at the Imperial 
German Embassy, met with Hozier in London to affirm Lloyd‘s rights on the island, 
subject to several conditions: (1) the corporation must keep the existing structures in an 
―efficient state of repair,‖ (2) the signalman must be a German citizen, and (3) signals 
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necessary for the service of the Imperial Navy must have ―precedence over signals for 
Lloyd‘s.‖278 The committee responded with several suggested adjustments in January 
1893, with the most important provisions being that the Imperial German Marines 
continue signaling as they had been but that another German citizen be appointed at a 
later date to hand carry messages in order to defray telegraphy costs. Hozier also offered 
to provide payment to the soldiers employed by the underwriting house, a suggestion that 
was flatly refused by the admiral with whom negotiations were taking place, on the 
grounds that they were ―not permissible according to the view and principles prevailing 
on this subject in the German Army.‖279 As with the agency system, and later with the 
construction and manning of coastal stations, the British navy took a distinctly 
contradictory view to this practice. A second request was that Lloyd‘s be allowed to fly 
their own distinctive flag on the site, and finally that no agreement or work by non-
British personnel indicated any abrogation of Lloyd‘s right to signal at Helgoland, as 
guaranteed in the 1890 treaty.280 The agent on the island also stressed the importance of 
the training Marines would receive in tracking commercial shipping, particularly for 
wartime. This argument, later made when conducting similar negotiations with the 
Admiralty at the turn of the century, would later have a somewhat negative effect after 
the outbreak of World War I, when Helgoland, then fully fortified, became a critical 
component of Germany‘s naval strategy.281  Aside from logistical concerns, these 
demands pressured recognition of the corporation by the Imperial government, and by 
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extension, the importance and permanence of British commercial interests. In a 
memorandum to the committee of Lloyd‘s, Hozier stressed this notion by acknowledging 
the near uselessness of the site for signaling, much less for spending any money, because 
of the lack of shipping moving through the area.282 Noting that the corporation‘s rights on 
the island were specially bargained for and enshrined in the agreement, the secretary, first 
proposed in 1897, indicated that rather than conduct signaling themselves, they simply 
purchase a piece of land and erect one of their flags on the location to flaunt their right to 
do so and then persuade the German Marines to just pass along any pertinent 
information.283  
 By 1902, the Lloyd‘s Agent at Cuxhaven, from sources he would not divulge, 
indicated that naval authorities were anxious to convince Lloyd‘s to give up their 
exclusive privileges. Further recognizing the uselessness of the location for any but 
ceremonial means, the committee took steps to hand over their rights in return for several 
notable concessions, the most important of them being that ―Lloyd‘s should be supplied 
gratis, from all the Imperial German Naval Signal Stations, with all casualties and other 
information respecting commercial maritime vessels, obtained at these stations‖284 
Additionally, the secretary sought free information regarding all causalities, the ability to 
transmit orders to vessels, that the corporation be permitted to include the stations in the 
list occasionally published by Lloyd‘s, and that the house be given similar rights at any 
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station established in the future.285 In the next year, negotiations picked up between the 
underwriting organization, the German foreign office, and its naval authorities with the 
View from Helgoland Signal Station, 1898286 
 
result that most of the demands were agreed to by 1905 – most notably that Lloyd‘s, 
subject to several provisions, could receive shipping information from most of the area 
surrounding Helgoland at no charge save wireless or telegraphic transmission.287 While 
unique in the fact that all of these negotiations took place with a foreign government, the 
focus on responsibility for telegraphy and military manning of the stations were echoed 
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in similar arrangements reached with British territories, such as at Gibraltar, on the 
narrow straits between Spain and Africa, as well as domestic coastal stations. 
 The committee‘s interaction and negotiations with the authorities in Gibraltar 
provide an insightful account of the corporation‘s relationship with the nation‘s overseas 
possessions. In 1884 Hozier visited the location to discuss signaling with the authorities. 
In his report, he indicated that Gibraltar hosted three separate signal stations, one at 
Summit Station, Windmill Hill, and Lower Station. The second of these was connected 
via telegraph, at Lloyd‘s expense, to the Eastern Telegraph Company‘s office, from 
which intelligence was transmitted to London. The watchmen at the Lower Station sent 
information regarding casualties or passing vessels to concerned parties in town by 
messenger. In this last transfer, the secretary expressed his consternation over the belief 
that shipping agents and merchants were bribing carriers in order to receive intelligence 
earlier, thus delaying its reception at Lloyd‘s. The solution to this problem, in Hozier‘s 
opinion, was to completely monopolize the distribution of commercial information in 
Gibraltar.288 
 Acting on this decision in 1884, the secretary entered into an agreement with the 
military authorities at Gibraltar on the Iberian Peninsula, confirmed by the War Office, 
which made significant progress toward this goal. Under these new regulations, those at 
Windmill Hill telegraphed messages to the Summit Station, where they were forwarded 
to the Eastern Telegraph Company‘s office and thereafter to Lloyd‘s, which could 
conversely communicate with vessels through the same method. The key component of 
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this new arrangement was that the London underwriting organization received guaranteed 
preference over all messages save those sent in the service of the government.289 
 Over the next ten years, Lloyd‘s sought to further consolidate its interests in the 
region. Negotiations with military, colonial, and commercial figures on the peninsula 
highlight the tensions and criticisms created by and directed towards the corporation, as 
well as that entity‘s own self-perception. In May 1891, following correspondence with 
Major E.R. Hussey of the Signal Department, Colonel Hozier sought to further push the 
extent to which Lloyd‘s controlled the collection and distribution of intelligence from and 
within Gibraltar.290 The proposals that ensued from these discussions with the governor 
would have further delineated the roles of the existing stations, limiting Summit to 
military and naval use, while Windmill Hill would have been operated by Lloyd‘s and 
directly connected to the telegraph company, rather than the Summit station. Importantly, 
the Lower Station, as it had largely been an intelligence distribution center whose 
messages were allegedly regularly delayed, was to be taken completely out of the loop. 
Additionally, Hozier suggested that a Lloyd‘s signal superintendent, who had the 
authority to employ several telegraphists, preferably soldiers with a non-commissioned 
officer on duty so that the underwriting corporation‘s official would be in ―no way 
responsible for discipline, conduct, or cleanliness,‖ be stationed there. For all this, the 
house would pay £50 a year.291 Ultimately rejected by Colonial Secretary Henry Thurstan 
Holland, First Viscount Knutsford (1825-1914) as a result of ―commercial opposition,‖ 
the blatant audacity of the proposals gives some indication of the extent to which the 
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committee and its secretary believed their organization to be important and necessary.292 
According to Hussey, colonial authorities rejected any arrangement that would restrict or 
lessen the port dues, as vessels would no longer necessarily have to stop to receive 
specific intelligence. The chamber of commerce likewise disapproved of any systemic 
changes to the existing structure.293 Objecting to the more modest arrangements proposed 
in response, the committee replied that:  
Shipping information should, with the view of prevention of fraud, be 
distributed by an impartial organization such as Lloyd‘s, which has no 
interest in the movements of shipping or in making contracts for the 
salvage of vessels or cargoes. It would appear that the only means by 
which this can be secured is by the Signal Station which distributes 
commercial intelligence being administered by a signalman under the 
control of an impartial authority such as Lloyd‘s.294 
 
If the underwriters would not benefit from the arrangement, these leaders suggested to 
the Colonial Secretary that perhaps the £50 subsidy should cease to be paid. As a result 
of these failed negotiations, the committee abandoned their efforts until 1893.295 
 Between 1894 and 1903, the three major parties continued to work through their 
disputes, finally resulting in a profitable agreement for all parties, particularly the 
underwriters and possibly excepting the merchants in Gibraltar. Before this new 
agreement, the station lost £36 annually. The 1903 agreement set payments between 
Lloyd‘s and the War Department at fixed rates: £85 for signal staff from the Royal 
Engineers, £15 a year for a flag at Windmill Hill and the use of the military‘s telegraph 
line from that location to the Upper Signal Station, and another £60 directly to the War 
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Department, which was offset by an estimated £100 annually in receipts from ship 
agents in Gibraltar to be turned over to the underwriting organization. On their end, the 
governor of the territory and the Commanding Royal Engineer agreed to telegraph all 
casualties they observed directly and immediately to Lloyd‘s, as well as news of all 
passing vessels three times a day. Taking into account the profits made from selling the 
information to local merchants and those involved in commerce, the committee 
estimated that annual expenses for the station would total £176, with an income of 
£185.296 After nearly twenty years of persistent and demanding negotiations, the 
underwriting organization managed not only to have the military carry out their 
operations for them, but to actually make a profit of £9 a year for doing so. During this 
same period, the committee of Lloyd‘s was also pushing for similar concessions around 
the world, but particularly along Britain‘s coastline. 
 In 1900, the Admiralty through Sir Gerard Noel decided that all coastal war signal 
stations should be manned and worked in peace time as in war.297 Many of the existing 
coast guard stations were in very close proximity to those operated by Lloyd‘s, and it 
seemed to Noel ―absurd‖ that the two should operate so close together when one would 
suffice.298 To accomplish this consolidation, he proposed a plan that would eventually 
lead to eighteen key locations, aside from those at which a similar arrangement was 
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already in effect, be manned by the coast guard to do Lloyd‘s work.299 Noel gave two 
principal reasons for this exchange: ―to practice for war in peace time, so as to render 
there official in wartime, a matter of vital importance,‖ and that often only one site 
existed for a signal station, and this was also often already held by Lloyd‘s, which 
stressed the ―time, trouble, and expense,‖ required to obtain them.300 
 Over the next three years, correspondence continued between Hozier, as secretary 
for Lloyd‘s, and naval officials. These communications are particularly enlightening for 
understanding the development of the corporation‘s intelligence network over the 
previous half century. While Hozier was admittedly eager to assist in the martial 
protection of shipping and mercantile interests, he also made it abundantly clear that his 
first obligation was to the members of Lloyd‘s.301 The corporation already had an 
agreement in place that allowed them to be placed at the disposal of naval authorities, 
using either existing staff or their own people in the event of the outbreak of a European 
war.  Thus, some framework had already been established for such a handover of 
signaling responsibilities.302 Hozier‘s concern, however, was that maritime intelligence 
should continue to be supplied to Lloyd‘s, and exclusively to Lloyd‘s.303 He cited the 
reason for the development of signal stations in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
namely that they arose out of a case of fraud that indicated the necessity of the 
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corporation being the first to know of the appearance of any overdue ship, particularly 
before its owner received word.304 Out of this grew a circumstance in which Lloyd‘s 
corporate resources, as necessarily larger than those of a private individual, had ―a 
practical monopoly‖ on commercial intelligence in the United Kingdom. From the 
underwriter‘s perspective, any agreement with the Admiralty would have to sustain this 
advantage.305 In addition to ensuring the steady and timely flow of information continued 
to the underwriters, some provision would have to be made that prohibited any 
competitor from moving in and establishing stations of their own.306 
 What resulted in 1904 was an agreement that, despite Hozier‘s attempts to portray 
it as primarily beneficial to the Admiralty, saved Lloyd‘s substantial amounts of money 
and granted the corporation numerous exclusive privileges and powers.307 The Admiralty 
calculated that it would save the insurance house twenty-seven to thirty-five pounds 
annually per station and perhaps double that if coast guard members worked at night. If 
naval officials undertook the work at the minimum of eighteen coastal locations, this 
would reduce costs by £486 per year using the lower estimate.308 Even if this number is 
somewhat high, it still represented a considerable cost reduction for Lloyd‘s and indicates 
the vast resources directed towards the gathering of intelligence around the world, 
particularly when remembering that by 1891, more than ten years earlier, 160 stations 
already existed. Additionally, Lloyd‘s was granted 4percent interest on ―all initial capital 
expenditures incurred in acquiring or establishing the stations‖ and relieved of the cost of 
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internal repairs as well as several taxes. In situations in which the station was more than 
one-half mile from a British Postal Telegraph Office, connecting wire would be laid at 
government expense.309  
 During this period, Lloyd‘s also engaged British and other states‘ government 
officials abroad. The Signal Stations sub-committee‘s memorandum from 1902 provides 
some incredibly striking examples of such interaction. In one region of the world, the 
Mediterranean, Red Sea and across the Near East, members debated what to do with the 
concessions granted by the governments of Egypt and the Sudan that gave Lloyd‘s a 
monopoly on wireless telegraphy in those countries.310 In the report regarding Africa, the 
committee agreed that the corporation should accept a site for a station near Mombasa 
granted by the British East Africa Protectorate, as it would cost Lloyd‘s nothing.311 
Additionally, in this document, considerable attention stresses and entertains the notion 
of whether various governments such as Portugal, Natal, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and 
Cape Colony should be approached for the granting of further privileges.312  
 As the twentieth century began, Lloyd‘s of London was secure in its unique 
position of influence, but was soon to face additional challenges. Since the 1870s, the 
underwriting corporation had worked with Germany in more ways than the signal 
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stations, particularly by insuring its commercial shipping.313 As early as 1906, the 
Committee for Imperial Defense began inquiries into the effect a war with the rising 
continental power would have. It found that the earnings from premiums for the German 
mercantile marine was so profitable that, in order to keep the business, underwriters 
promised to pay on all war losses, even those caused by the Royal Navy.314  
 At the same time, the corporation worked ever more closely with the Admiralty in 
war preparations. In 1905, Lloyd‘s agreed to build four signal stations in Hong Kong, 
Sierra Leone, Mauritius and Fiji for the navy after the Treasury had refused to grant the 
necessary funds. In 1909, the committee helped establish an espionage network to track 
the German High Sea Fleet. The transmission of the corporation‘s considerable existing 
intelligence was further expedited through the installation of a secret telephone line that 
directly connected the secretary of Lloyd‘s to the Admiralty.315 Thus, the careful and 
deliberate fostering of this public-private relationship over the course of the previous 
century continued into the next and still echoes in the institution‘s commanding presence 
in the field of insurance.  
 By the end of the nineteenth century, what had started out as essentially a 
wagering process over one hundred and fifty years earlier at the Royal Exchange was 
now a science, gathering, controlling, and analyzing vast quantities of data to accurately 
and profitably conduct business. Underwriting required those involved in the industry to 
not only be aware of available decision making resources, but to utilize them in an 
effective and consistent manner, thus maximizing profits. 
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 Lloyd‘s is a unique and enduring British institution that ensured and sustained its 
relevance through active engagement with military, political, and commercial individuals 
and bureaucracies. Its leadership and policies bridged a gap between the private sphere of 
finance and the public sphere at both ends of the societal spectrum, from orphaned 
children of soldiers and a news-hungry population to the ruling establishment. 
Concurrently, the institution‘s leading members represented the burgeoning economic 
elite whose wealth and source of power emanated not from land, but merchant activity, 
speculation, and the financial services sector. Neither the Barings, Goschen, Angerstein 
nor many others involved with Lloyd‘s came from the traditional aristocracy, but as 
either creators or scions of other fortunes, they gradually exerted more pressure and 
influence on those responsible for the affairs of the state.316 They formed intricate 
networks based on business and family relationships that in many ways threatened the 
hereditary power brokers, even in the first half of the nineteenth century.317 Furthermore, 
as a private enterprise with a global reach, and not just within the British Empire, they 
came very close to conforming to Hobson‘s ―internationalism.‖318 They integrated cross 
border communications networks with public engagement, transnational conflict 
resolution and prevention, and government participation in the pursuit of profitability. 
 Enduring the turmoil and uncertainty of the South Sea Bubble crisis in 1720, this 
relatively speculative insurance venture gradually transformed by the turn of the 
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nineteenth century into a financial powerhouse that issued a vast majority of the over 90 
percent of marine insurance covered by individuals. The seventy-nine men who formed  
New Lloyd‘s Coffee House in 1771 distanced themselves from the often disreputable 
history of the insurance business, and through the formation of a governing committee, 
the collection of subscriptions, and a strict set of regulations, primed their organization  
for the wave of business presented over the next century. The simultaneous rise in the 
number of vessels operating throughout the world and the increased risk brought about by 
nearly thirty years of continuous naval conflict brought new opportunities and  untold 
profit to those with the financial capabilities for taking on this environment.  
 The Napoleonic Wars, the War of 1812, and rampant piracy, while accounting for 
the profound success of Lloyd‘s, also created the atmosphere which made possible the 
de-monopolization of the marine insurance industry. The high number of losses and the 
necessary financial backing to insure these investments opened the door for criticism of 
the individual underwriting system. Whereas only two corporations legally had the right 
to effect policies before 1824, the relaxation of those regulations following nearly fifteen 
years of petitioning by the London business community greatly expanded options for 
shipowners. The decrease in business for those attached to Lloyd‘s necessitated 
significant structural change within the house.  
 The rearrangement of the managing committee in 1811, particularly the increased 
importance assigned to the secretary and committee of correspondence, marked a 
pronounced increase in proactive engagement with government, military, and business 
interests around the world. Recognizing the value and competitive advantage that 
accompanied control of information, the members of Lloyd‘s embarked on a farsighted 
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and intricate program of contact development. The agency system, formalized through 
instructions and appointments issued later that year, formed the bedrock of the entity‘s 
link to global commercial interests, fraud prevention measures, and, to a large extent, the 
shaping of government policy.  These individuals, through their consistent, reliable, and 
timely provision of information to the London office, ensured that the members of 
Lloyd‘s could make educated, and therefore profitable, decisions. That many of the 
agents simultaneously held diplomatic and military positions within the British Empire 
enhanced the gradually coalescing relationship between this private entity and the 
nation‘s governing elite. 
 As the nineteenth century progressed, Lloyd‘s global economic and political 
presence took a more concrete form through the establishment of the signal stations. 
Developed to their furthest extent under Henry M. Hozier, secretary of the corporation 
for nearly forty years, these sources and routers of intelligence took procurement to a new 
level by adding an increased measure of exclusivity. As signal stations, by their nature, 
required valuable land near port entrances and major sea routes as well as competent, 
trained employees, Lloyd‘s had to engage more often and effectively with foreign and 
domestic government officials. As was seen through the inclusion of a right to conduct 
operations in the cession of Helgoland, Lloyd‘s multi-year negotiation with German 
military officials, consideration of both official and commercial interests in Gibraltar, and 
the operation of all domestic coastal stations by the coast guard after the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the committee was highly effective in their pursuance of privilege. In 
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all of these agreements, the secretary sought to secure a monopoly on marine 
information, which, by 1902, he believed Lloyd‘s had achieved.319 
 Throughout all these advances, the underwriting house and its members relied on 
strategically placed allies at many levels throughout the government. From members of 
Parliament, Lords Mayor, military and diplomatic personnel abroad and at home, and 
cabinet members, Lloyd‘s recognized and exploited the possibilities of unique private-
public partnerships. With these connections came power and influence that allowed the 
corporation to not only react quickly and effectively to losses, but even permitted it to 
manipulate and lessen risk itself. Agreements by the Admiralty to enforce convoy 
regulations during the wars of the early nineteenth century lessened the chance that 
underwriters would have to pay on policies, thus increasing the profits made by the high 
rate of premiums. The corporation‘s durability and respectability also allowed its 
members unique access to policy formation, particularly as expert witnesses in 
Parliamentary inquiries. Through these avenues, subscribers to Lloyd‘s could enhance 
their own prestige, as well as that of the corporation, while at the same time often 
providing a genuine service to the British marine community, as well as that of other 
nations.  
 This work has sought to provide some new insight into the complex web of 
relationships that operated in a vital sector of Imperial Britain‘s economy. Many of the 
arguments and conclusions put forward were based, in a large part, on available materials 
from Lloyd‘s own collections. Naturally, this approach, limited by time and resources, 
cannot provide a full and complete picture of the topic. Perhaps most importantly, work 
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remains to be done coming from the other side, namely, using Admiralty, Board of Trade, 
and private records from those with whom underwriters and the committee for managing 
its affairs had contact. This thesis has, however, constructed a framework on which future 
scholarship can build, by addressing not what effect shipping had on the growth of the 






















Agent- An individual appointed by the committee at Lloyd‘s to act as a 
representative in domestic and foreign ports. He was typically responsible for 
relaying information concerning claims back to the underwriters, coordinating 
quality and reasonably priced services during payments on policies, particularly in 
ship repairs, and providing the committee with any intelligence thought necessary 
for the conduct of affairs at Lloyd‘s. 
Chairman- Led the committee. While not always directly involved in the day to 
day affairs of the corporation, this figure often held high political or social 
position outside of Lloyd‘s. This quality enabled him to serve as a liaison with 
government, military, and other financial enterprises.  
Committee at Lloyd’s- Formalized in 1811, this body was responsible for the 
managing of affairs at Lloyd‘s. Its members concurrently held rotating positions 
in the committee of the treasury, responsible for financial matters, and the 
committee of correspondence, responsible for the gathering of relevant 
information and maintaining contacts with individuals and bodies outside of the 
corporation. Its members were elected by subscribers at annual general meetings. 
House- Derived from Lloyd‘s origin as a coffee-house, this term was used 
throughout the nineteenth century as a reference to Lloyd‘s. 
Secretary of Lloyd’s- An employee of Lloyd‘s, this individual was the body‘s 
chief administrator, responsible for carrying out the goals and recommendations 
of the committee. Particularly in the latter half of the century, this individual was 
97 
 
most actively engaged with the corporation‘s expansion, external affairs, and 
communication. 
Signal Station- A building, optimally on a prime piece of real estate adjacent to a 
port or heavily traveled sea-route, which facilitated the gathering and transmission 
of information back to the committee. Not always manned by individuals only 
connected with Lloyd‘s, regulations and agreements reached with foreign and 
domestic governments nevertheless made them a source of exclusive information 
for the house. They were the most blatant and visible source of Lloyd‘s hegemony 
in the marine insurance market. 
Subscriber- Anyone who paid regular dues to be able to conduct underwriting at 
Lloyd‘s. 
Underwriter- In the nineteenth century at Lloyd‘s, always an individual who 
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